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ABSTRACT 
 
The evolution of Critical Infrastructures (CIs) is enabling society to improve our quality 
of life, and thereby, we are increasingly relying on them. Major disruptions occurred dur-
ing the lasts few years to CIs led society to have higher awareness of the need of an effi-
cient protection.  However, the increasing complexity and interconnectedness of CIs 
makes it very difficult to protect them from major disruptions.  
This project investigates which are the classical methods of emergency management, 
their limitations and how dealing with crisis can be improved by implementing resilience, 
particularly for unforeseen events. Moreover, the main characteristics of Resilient Organ-
isations are described, and how they can prevent, absorb and recover major disruptions in 
Critical Infrastructures. We analyse the Farris-Sommersted incident, which major disrup-
tion affected the rail freight sector considerably.  
To do that, we interview three key decision makers from the biggest companies affected 
by the disruption, Banedanmark and DB Schenker. Based on the information provided by 
the interviewees, we identify the main resilient features that both companies have. We 
observe that good communication within the company and with stakeholders, and organ-
isational learning are key aspects to continuously enhance resilience in organisations.  
Moreover, we conclude that while private companies may need resilience to take ad-
vantage from their competitors, public organisations should guarantee resilience for the 
good of society. 
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This chapter reflects the general overview of the problem to which this research aims 
to approach. Nowadays, societies have a high demand of quality living standards. These 
standards are highly related to an optimal performance of Critical Infrastructures (CIs).  
Therefore, CIs must be reliable and protected from hazardous events.   
 
1.1 Overview 
In recent decades, the welfare of society has increased exponentially in almost every 
country throughout the world. Quality in areas such as economy, political stability, safety, 
health infrastructures, etc. are not only wanted but also required.  The vast majority of the 
population needs electricity, transport, water supply and communications to function 
properly. Critical Infrastructures (CIs) provide these services, and societies have become 
increasingly dependent on them. Therefore, they should be reliable as major disruptions 
can cause severe impacts on communities.  
 
Disturbances in CIs can vary from a regional power outage causing congestion in a 
nearby power line that results in a national power outage to a major event such as an 
environmental disaster. Causing the complete loss of assets of even loss of life. Undoubt-
edly, such disruptions may lead to great inconvenience for industries and what is worse, 
loss of life, assets or vital services for citizens, e.g. health services to the frail and the el-
derly people.  
 
Interdependency between CIs adds complexity to crises. This interdependency and in-
terconnection makes it so that when a disruption occurs, the negative effect is not only in 
the focus of the CI but also can affect other important infrastructures of a country or neigh-
boring countries.  Hence, interconnectedness between the elements makes it difficult to 
predict how a crisis will evolve and what the outcome will be, which is known as the 
“cascading effect”. 
 
Many disruptive events cannot be prevented but national policies or frameworks can 
prepare a country for unavoidable disruptive events.  The level of protection and resilience 
1 INTRODUCTION 
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in developed and developing countries will change the consequences dramatically. Devel-
oping countries are more vulnerable as the infrastructures have poorer quality. Therefore, 
these are more susceptible to any type of natural hazard. For instance, the 7.3 magnitude 
earthquake in Kathmandu, Nepal (April, 2015) caused around 8000 deaths with the com-
plete destruction of most of the buildings as the structure of the buildings was very weak. 
On the other hand, developed countries are more vulnerable to other attacks such as 
cyberattacks or terrorism. 
 
When organizations manage public infrastructures and there is a disturbance several 
stakeholders can suffer the consequences. Supply chain gaps, shortages in raw materials 
of loss of customers are some of the problems that can originate. The ability of organiza-
tions to keep operating in times of crisis is a significant requirement.  Furthermore, it will 
provide reliability and confidence from the customers towards the organization. Despite 
this, many organizations are found to be inadequately prepared to manage an unexpected 
disturbance.  
 
1.2 Critical Infrastructures 
 
The term infrastructure is defined as: 
“the basic physical and organisational structures and facilities (e.g. buildings, 
roads, and power supplies) needed for the operation of a society or enterprise”. 
(OED) 
 
A Critical Infrastructure can be defined as:  
“an asset, system and network, physical or virtual, which is essential for the mainte-
nance of vital societal functions, health, safety, security, economy, or any combination 
thereof.  The destruction of which would have a debilitating effect in a community as a 
result of the failure to maintain those functions” (EU Commission, 2008; Department 
of Homeland Security, 2013) 
 
Critical Infrastructures help to enhance the advantages of societies providing electric-
ity, water, heating, and different basic needs (Laperrouza, 2009).  Furthermore, one of the 
key factors to become a developed country is to enhance and maintain an advanced system 
of infrastructures (Baldoni et al., 2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
Introduction 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
The European Union defines European Critical Infrastructures (ECIs) as: 
“Critical Infrastructure located in Member States the disruption or de-
struction of which would have a significant impact on at least two Member 
States. The significance of the impact shall be assessed in terms of cross-cut-
ting criteria. This includes effects resulting from cross-sector dependencies 
on other types of infrastructure.” (European Commission, 2008).  
 
The EU makes a distinction between four CI of European Dimension: the elected cases 
cover the transport, space and energy Sectors (European Commission, 2013); 
● Eurocontrol: is designated to manage around 30000 flights every day 
through the EU Air Traffic Management (ATM) 
● Galileo: European satellite navigation system 
● Electricity transmission grid and  
● Gas transmission network.  
 
Those dimensions were selected because a disruption in one of them can affect directly 
to other Member States. (European Commission, 2013). 
 
On the other hand, the United States has developed a more specific list of CIs sectors, 
with the aim of having different strategies in case any disruption occurs. The CIs are di-
vided according to: Chemical, Commercial facilities, Communications, Critical manufac-
turing, Dams, Defence industrial base, Emergency services and Energy (Department of 
Homeland Security, 2013). 
 
Many of these sectors can be included in the classification that makes the EU, but with 
the US division system, it is easier to see how society can be affected if one of these 
services fail. It is also possible to appreciate that CIs can be negatively influenced not only 
by physical injuries, but also by cybernetic attacks (Brown, 2006; Ten et al., 2010; Baldoni 
et al., 2014) The evolution of technology and the dependence on Internet have made that 
a CI can be damaged through the Internet, i.e. hacked. Companies and organizations must 
consider this point and must be continuously developing Security Systems for the CIs (Ten 
et al., 2010) 
 
1.3 Critical Infrastructures’ protection 
Critical infrastructures are linked to civilization since its inception. Important harbours 
and roads helped cities to develop thanks to the ease citizens had when trading. Therefore 
any disturbance in these infrastructures could cause a slowdown of the progress (Brown, 
2006). That is why protection of CI has been an important issue from many centuries ago. 
Nevertheless, emergency plans did not appear until modern times (Brown, 2006). 
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It was not until important accidents such as Bhopal in 1984 (BBCa) and Chernobyl 
(BBCb) two years after, that organizations became aware of the need of emergency plans 
(Labaka, 2013). Those disasters revealed many deficiencies in CIs around the world. 
These weaknesses were dangerous not only for the integrity of the facilities, but also for 
human lives. However, the turning point that made governments have real consciousness 
about the need of protecting CIs was the 9/11 terrorist attack (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 
2003), and Hurricane Katrina (SERT, 2014). 
 
Emergency plans and protection measures usually detail how to solve specific prob-
lems, depending on the failure of the CI.  However, once organisations have gained expe-
rience, they have learned that prevention measures are essential to avoid crises (Tveiten 
et al., 2012). 
 
There are multiple threats that may cause major disruptions to Critical Infrastructures 
– considering major disruption as an event that results in an alteration or discontinuity of 
high complexity and with several components of the system involved. The threats can 
adopt different forms and may be unpredictable. First of all, organizations that specialize 
in protection of CIs should always bear in mind problems caused by natural disasters such 
as hurricanes, fallen trees, floods, etc. (Boin & Van Eeten, 2013). 
 
Secondly, there are number of crises due to technological failures. These failures can 
be caused by poor maintenance of the system, the use of an obsolete technology, accidents 
or human error.  To avoid these issues it is essential to carry out periodic reviews, moni-
toring as much as possible and have a strict control of what is done and what needs to be 
done (Tveiten et al., 2012). 
 
Finally, another important aspect that organizations have to deal with are the intentional 
attacks, such as terrorism, against CIs. There are many reasons for these attacks: economy, 
religion or war among others, and traditionally have been physical injuries. But with the 
evolution of new technologies and the dependency society have on them, cybernetic at-
tacks have become more recurrent. 
“We weren’t blinded by the Soviet threat anymore. We were seeing these other 
threats. Those groups, because of our cyber dependence, now had a way of at-
tacking the nation without ever encountering the nation’s defense forces.... You 
couldn’t fly a bomber at the United States without encountering a radar warning 
system. You couldn’t fire a missile at the United States, anywhere in the world, 
without encountering a space-based detection capability.  You could, however, 
launch what we called a logic bomb.   There are all kinds of names for them, but 
you could launch an attack, a cyber-attack, without ever encountering anything 
except the public switch network, the Internet, and the World Wide Web.” 
President’s Commission on Infrastructure Protection, Phil Lacombe                
Oral History Interview (Brown, 2006) 
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Nowadays, due to globalization and the modernization of new technologies, interde-
pendence and interrelation between CIs are growing considerably (Figure 1). This is gen-
erally favorable to society and economy, since it is a way of coordinating efforts of CIs in 
order to achieve faster the purpose of the Infrastructures (Baldoni et al., 2014).  Intercon-
nection between infrastructures and their complexity makes very difficult to have specific 
guidelines to follow if a crisis arises (Turner & Pidgeon 1997; Perrow, 1984). Cascading 
effects may cause numerous and unpredictable problems to face up making it impossible 
to have emergency plans for every specific crisis that can occur.  
 
 
Figure 1: Examples of infrastructure interdependencies (Rinaldi, Peerenboom & Kelly, 
2001) 
 
Therefore, the protection and reliability of CIs has been a vital issue not only for gov-
ernments, but also for stakeholders such as freight or electricity companies.  It is essential 
to minimize the effect of a disruption in CIs and, if possible, prevent any possible accident 
or attack. 
 
Some theories emerged because of the uncertainty caused by the complexity of the new 
systems and infrastructures. Normal Accident Theory (NAT) offers society the juncture 
to accept the uncertainty, bring resources to bear, or not use the technology (Perrow, 
1984). Normal Accident Theory differs from High Reliability Theory (HRT), since the 
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latter points out that it is possible to avoid accidents with the correct organizational frame-
work. Therefore, some organizations evolved to High Reliability Organizations (HRO), 
which offers society a challenge to move forward (Labaka, 2013). 
 
Resilient organizations have recently emerged. Resilience frameworks do not establish 
plans that can solve specific problems, but they suggest a way of working, a mentality for 
organizations and between organizations and a way of acting with the purpose to avoid, 
mitigate, recover and solve problems (Boin & Van Eeten, 2013).  Resilience may help 
systems and organisations ‘survive’ an unexpected hazard (Vugrin & Camphouse, 2011). 
 
1.4 Terminology: From Incident to catastrophes. 
 
Emergencies are abnormal situations for which the evolution of events is uncertain and 
if they are not properly managed they can turn into a crisis or create damage and casualties 
(Wybo& Lonka, 2002).  Several authors (Mitroff & Anagnos, 2000; Pearson & Clair, 
1998; Coleman, 2004) define Crises as a consequence of an unexpected and low proba-
bility triggering event that suddenly assails all the system causing a great (Pearson & Clair, 
1998). 
 
Incidents are defined as unexpected changes from a systems’ normal behaviour with 
the potential of causing a crisis. (Cooke & Rohleder, 2006). On the other hand, Perrow 
(Perrow, 1984) differentiates between incident and accident based on the extension of the 
damage and if the system is disrupted or not.  If the system goes back to normality without 
the need of being fixed it is considered an incident.  Incidents are situations that are man-
aged by already implemented safety procedures and devices (Wybo & Lonka, 
2002). However, Perrow argues that if repairing the system is necessary, given that the 
damage disrupts the operation of the system, it will be considered as an accident.  Both, 
incidents and accidents are seen as Emergencies. 
 
Crises, having a higher severity, may be distinguished into disasters and catastrophes.  
Disasters are defined as important disruptions of the functioning of a society or commu-
nity that involve human, economic, environmental or material impacts and losses, exceed-
ing the ability of the affected society or community to cope using its own resources. 
(UNISDR, 2009).  On the other hand, Catastrophes are the accidents that have gone out 
of control and that the worst case scenario of combinations of factors have occurred (Wybo 
& Lonka, 2002) 
 
Quarantelli provides six characteristics for catastrophes compared to disasters: 1) most 
of the structure is heavily impacted 2) local workers cannot take their usual work role 3) 
nearby communities cannot support with help 4) most of the functions are interrupted 5) 
mass media is more attracted (Quarantelli, 2005) 
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Figure 2: Terminology based on (Labaka, 2013) 
 
Despite all the formal definitions, throughout the thesis we will use the term Crisis 
and Emergency Management indistinctly as well as emergency, crisis, catastrophe, 
disruption, accident, disaster, and incident interchangeably.   Practitioners and re-
searchers often make the same decision (Dugdale et al., 2009).   
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1.5 Research approach 
1.5.1 Research objectives 
The primary objective of this research is to investigate how resilience-based ap-
proaches can strengthen the management of major disruptions in Critical Infrastructures. 
The primary objective will be decomposed into the following sub-objectives: 
 
• Describe Critical Infrastructures and the sense in which they are critical. 
• Analyse the notion of Resilience and how it applies to Emergency Management. 
• Compare standard emergency management methods and Resilience-based ap-
proaches to managing emergencies 
• Describe main precursor frameworks and models of  Resilience 
• Investigate the applicability of Resilience to operators of Critical Infrastructures 
• Explore to what extent the Resilience framework captures a selected case in-
volving the management of a major disruption event in the Danish railway net-
work.  
 
1.5.2 Research questions 
Based on the research objectives we investigate the following questions: 
 
• WHAT ARE THE KEY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE CLASSICAL APPROACH TO EMER-
GENCY MANAGEMENT AND RESILIENCE-BASED APPROACHES? 
 
• ACCORDING TO THE LITERATURE, WHAT ARE THE MAIN FEATURES THAT MAKE AN 
ORGANIZATION RESILIENT IN A CONTEXT OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES? 
 
• WHAT IS THE ADDITIONAL VALUE OF RESILIENCE-BASED EMERGENCY MANAGE-
MENT TO CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE OPERATORS, EXEMPLIFIED IN THE CASE 
STUDY? 
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1.5.3 Structure 
The project is divided into seven Chapters. In Chapter 1, Critical Infrastructures are 
characterized including the sense in which they are critical to society.   
The second chapter (Chapter 2) goes through the literature of Normal Accident Theory 
and analyses the strengths and weaknesses of Emergency Management, and why Resili-
ence adds new. Coming up next (Chapter 3), the general perspective of Resilience is de-
scribed. Following this, there is the differentiation of types and dimensions of resilience, 
and its lifecycle steps.  
 
The next chapter (Chapter 4) focuses on which characteristics and policies CIs should 
have in order to be resilient.  After the study of what CIs and Resilience are, and how can 
CIs be resilient, Resilience in Organizations is analysed (Chapter 5), highlighting which 
are the features these organisations share.  
 
Finally, having understood the added value of resilience and the required characteristics 
of organizations and CIs to deal with trigger events, a concrete, major disruption is se-
lected for study: the Farris - Sommersted incident (Chapter 6). To better analyze the inci-
dent, there is a brief introduction of the role and importance of rail transport, with a focus 
on the Danish Railway system. Based on first-hand interviews made with the Chief Man-
agers of the organisations involved in the incident (Banedanmark and DB Schenker) re-
silience in both organizations is analysed.  
 
1.5.4 Methodology 
 
The research methodology must be tailored to the research objectives and research 
questions.  This research has the aim to review and analyse resilience and apply it to or-
ganisations related to critical infrastructures.  
 
A) Selection of literature 
 
We began by reading the Doctoral dissertation by Leire Labaka: Resilience in Or-
ganisations suggested by our supervisor.  While we were reading, we broadened our 
knowledge by reading the papers of experts to whom Labaka referenced. 
 
Once our first contact with resilience was established, we had the opportunity to 
assist to the International Conference:  Creating Resilience Capabilities against Crit-
ical Infrastructure Disruptions: Foundations, Practices and Challenges on the 13th of 
April in Copenhagen, Denmark.  The conference was based defining methods, solu-
tions and challenges on major Critical Infrastructure disruptions such as means of 
19 
Introduction 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
communication, healthcare, power and water supply systems, electronic communica-
tions systems, etc.  The following day, we assisted to the conference’s workshop, with 
the lecturers of the conference – Arjen Boin, Kathleen Tierney and Kurt Petersen, 
among others.  
 
Further literature searches were made with the use of Google Scholar, Google and 
DTU findit. 
 
B) Case Study 
 
We selected a case that satisfied the following requirements: 1) unexpected and 
unforeseen event, 2) disruption of a critical infrastructure, 3) impact in public and 
private organisations and 4) access to information and key persons involved. 
 
Thanks to the help of our supervisor, we interviewed the key decision makers dur-
ing the incident.  We developed several interview questions and sent them to the in-
terviewees in advance.  During the interview, we followed the guideline of questions 
and improvised throughout the interview. The interviews were recorded in order to 
transcribe them partially. Questions and the transcripts are included in Appendix F 
and G. 
 
Furthermore, we have collected and summarized data about our case and finally we 
have tried to extract the presence or absence of Resilience features by studying the 
actions and structure of both organisations.  At last, we have made a comparison be-
tween the two organisations studied.  
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As a result to CIs complexity, due to the interconnection between systems, theories 
such as NAT and HRT have emerged.  In this chapter both theories are presented and 
compared.  A core subject in this chapter is to describe Crisis Management and its 
stages and finally show its limitations. 
 
2.1 Getting to resilience 
Interconnection of different systems, their complexity and the dependence between 
them makes extremely difficult for organizations to control the multiple components of a 
system. As a result, some theories have emerged in the wake of this assumption. 
2.1.1 Can accidents be avoided? 
In 1984 the social scientist Charles Perrow published “Normal Accidents: Living with 
High-Risk Systems”. In this book, Perrow studied complex systems and developed the 
Normal Accident Theory (Perrow, 1984).  He argues - based on the Three Mile Island 
Accident (BBCc) among others - that an accident may begin with a common event, but, 
due to the system’s complexity, it can evolve into a severe accident due to the “cascading 
effect”, and its progress is unpredictable.  The combination of human and technical com-
ponents can provoke small incidents. These incidents can lead to bigger accidents because 
of a series of technical cause-effect chains (Whitney, 2003).  
 
Our systems are composed of a wide network of devices that work jointly to do a spe-
cific task.   Perrow argues that it is possible that one of these devices fail at the same time 
of the failure of another device in such big networks. Thereby, a failure that is trivial by 
itself, interacting with other trivial failures can lead to an accident. This effect is known 
as “interactive complexity”.  
 
To reduce the probability of failure, complex systems rely on technology and its im-
provement to the extent that in many cases we need machines to control other machines 
(Perrow, 1984). The new technology may fix old security flaws, but may cause new ones 
2 STATE OF THE ART 
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(Marais et al., 2004; Shrivastava et al., 2009). According to Perrow, technology’s innova-
tion is not enough to minimize the risk of accidents (Perrow, 1984).  
 
“If interactive complexity and tight coupling -system characteristics- 
inevitably will produce an accident, I believe we are justified in call-
ing it normal accident, or a system accident. The odd term normal ac-
cident is meant to signal that, given the system characteristics, multi-
ply and unexpected interactions of failures are inevitable. This is an 
expression of an integral characteristic of the system, not a statement 
of frequency [...]. System accidents are uncommon, even rare; yet this 
is not all reassuring, if they can produce catastrophes” 
Normal Accident Theory: Living with High-Risk Technologies. 
Charles Perrow (Perrow, 1984).  
 
However, in complex systems, a possibility of failure will always remain. Systems are 
influenced by several internal or external factors, such as humans, environment, design of 
the system, procedures, technology, etc.  It is impossible to control all these variables, 
since these factors are also composed by many other variables (Marais et al., 2004). Fol-
lowing this statement, systems should try to reduce their complexity and their tight cou-
pling.  Experience, better designs, training, good organizational framework or periodic 
security controls are some of the key aspects to minimize the probability of accidents 
(Perrow, 1984).  
 
To sum up, Normal Accident Theory does not say that accidents in complex systems 
are common, but are inherent in a complex system. The more complex a system is, the 
more likely it is to suffer an accident. Thereby, isolated systems seem to be the only ones 
with an option of being safe, which is impossible in today’s society. 
 
On the other hand, Karlene Roberts (Roberts, 1990) developed the High Reliability 
Theory (HRT) with some colleagues from the Berkeley campus of the University of Cal-
ifornia studying what common aspects organisations with high-risk of suffering crises had. 
They defined “Reliability” as the ability to maintain and execute error-free operations. 
Roberts and Weick (Roberts, 1990; Weick et al., 2001) describe the required elements that 
an organisation needs in order to avoid errors.  HRT is based on organisational theory and 
observations of organisations that are Highly Reliable (HRO) despite being very risky 
organisations.  HROs will be described in Chapter 5: Resilience in Organisations to have 
a better understanding of the topic.  
 
These two theories, NAT and HRT, differ in their perception of accidents’ occurrence 
and the possibility of avoiding them.  On one hand, NAT determines that accidents will 
occur despite the situation due to tight coupling and interactive complexity of systems. 
Both characteristics can provoke that a chain of little incidents become a bigger accident.  
22 
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On the other hand, HRT considers that it is possible to have a complex and still error-free 
system by enhancing its reliability. 
 
Both theories have interesting approaches. It is true that it is impossible to take into 
account all the variables of a complex system and therefore have the complete control of 
the situation; yet increasing capabilities may decrease the likelihood of an accident. 
2.2 Crisis/Emergency management 
 
Crisis management is an approach to deal with crises where organizations plan for sev-
eral worst-case scenarios and develop different solutions to overcome them. One of the 
main ways to establish a good performance of Crisis Management in a company is by trial 
and error since crises are usually unforeseen and the first solutions for a disruption may 
not be the most efficient ones. However, a common way to improve current plans is to 
learn from others’ mistakes (Castillo, 2005). 
 
The main goal of Crisis Management is to avoid crises or to be able to detect them and 
respond fast and efficiently, having different resources and skills available to confront the 
threats that an organization might have (Drennan et al., 2014).  
 
Furthermore, it is essential to work fast during the first hours of a crisis, so the planning 
managers have to specify clearly which the functions are for the employees and how fast 
each task should be performed. Therefore, Crisis Management planning sets in place pre-
determined plans and/or resources for the restoration of processes in the event of an acute 
and unexpected interruption or incident (Herbane, 2004). 
 
Majority of authors, (Drennan and McConnell, 2014; Alexander, 2002; Wheatley & 
Barnes, 2013) have defined four main phases of Crisis Management: Mitigation, Prepara-
tion, Response and Recovery.     
 
● Mitigation: These are the actions taken to identify possible risks, avoid their be-
fallen and reduce possible negative effects in organizations, human beings and in-
frastructures.    
● Preparation:   The organisational planning acivities in order to cope with foresee-
able events.  
● Response:  When the crisis starts, response actions minimize the impact in order 
to reduce losses and negative effects to the maximum extent.  
● Recovery:  The recovery stage encloses all the activities held to restore normal 
functioning of an organization or to return to a normal situation. 
 
If there is an infrastructure breakdown it is necessary to continue business as soon as 
possible. To achieve that, Crisis Management relies on Business Continuity.  
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Business Continuity 
From the business perspective, Business Continuity Management puts more attention in 
the company’s ability to continue operations during and after a crisis situation (Wong & 
Shi, 2014). 
“Business continuity is a management process that identifies poten-
tial factors that threaten an organization and provides a framework 
for building resilience and the capability for an effective response. 
This response must safeguard the interests of its key stakeholders, as 
well as the organization’s reputation, brand, and value-creating activ-
ities. Business continuity management is the subject of continuing de-
velopment and research”.   
Peter Speight. Securitas group,  
Uxbridge, London, UK (Wong & Shi, 2014). 
 
Business Continuity (BC) focuses mainly in how organizations can deal with an emer-
gency or a crisis, detailing which steps must be followed in order to maintain the critical 
business functions while minimizing the negative impacts. In other words, how organiza-
tions can face a disruption without interrupting their duties with themselves and their 
stakeholders (Wong & Shi, 2014). 
 
The International Organization for Standardization has designed the ISO 22301 (Wong 
& Shi, 2014) to protect any company against crisis. It allows the company to identify 
possible threats and what it should do to avoid stopping the activity in a proactive ap-
proach. ISO 22301 helps organisations minimize the recovery time and it is an effective 
way to demonstrate consumers, partners and other stakeholders their resilience.  Thereby, 
Business Continuity is an effective tool to better allocate the resources of the company, 
improve risk management and increase customers’ satisfaction. It is a cyclical process 
which is continuously evolving in time (Wong & Shi, 2014): 
2.2.1 Crisis Management limitations 
The major problem is that incidents will always happen, and it is impossible to prevent 
or foresee all possible crises. Even if the company has a well-resourced policy, it does not 
guarantee that the organization will be able to adapt to any circumstance (Smith & Elliott, 
2007). The complexity of Critical Infrastructures and their interconnection makes it diffi-
cult for one specific sector to know how their business can be affected by changes or 
disruptions in another CI.  Hence, it is not enough to have plans for the organizations’ 
threats. Crisis management efforts are limited due to a lack of flexibility, especially after 
extreme events. Resilient consciousness and some specific capabilities are needed in the 
company in order to be prepared to adapt, innovate and improvise for an unexpected ca-
tastrophe.  
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Besides, it is also difficult to learn from past mistakes and find organizational vulnera-
bilities. Smith and Elliott (Smith & Elliot, 2007) analysed the organizational learning from 
crisis literature: 
 
• Rigidity of core beliefs, values and assumptions that create problems when 
things appear to be “not as expected”.  
• Ineffective communication and problems with information-sharing. 
• Centrality of expertise, and disregard of external stakeholders. 
• Organizations and individuals may prioritize actions to cope with well-defined 
problems instead of dealing with ill structured problems.  
• Maladaptation to threats and environmental shifts. 
• A focus on single-loop learning.   
 
In the assumption that it is possible to plan against disruptions in Critical Infrastruc-
tures, it would require multi-agency cooperation and coordination, which may be a big 
complication due to different goals, culture, resources, capabilities, etc. (Boin & McCo-
nell, 2007). 
 
The economy of a company is also an issue to take into account. Having plans for every 
possible threat, train the staff or do simulations or workshops can be very expensive, and 
a lot of time is required. Therefore, many organizations do not prioritize the planning for 
unprobable events in front of their daily expenses (Boin &McConell, 2007).  
 
Once seen that Crisis Management has limitations both at a theoretical level (it is im-
possible to prevent every possible event) and at a practical level (difficulty of coordina-
tion, learning and lack of resources), there is the need to enhance a resilient mindset on 
organizations and society. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Added benefits for Critical Infrastructure Resilience Approach.  Based on 
(Wheatley & Barnes, 2013) 
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In the last decades, the concept of Resilience has increased its popularity. Hence, 
many literature is written about the subject. The intention of this chapter is to put to-
gether the different scopes in which resilience is presented.  On one hand, resilience is 
studied based on the outcome of the incident and the way systems ’bounce back’ or 
adapt to changes.  On the other hand, resilience can be integrated in different 5 core 
disciplines representing the domains of a social system: economic, technological, psy-
chological and societal resilience.  Finally, the Resilience lifecycle steps based on Crisis 
Management stages are presented. 
 
 
Resilience is the the ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to 
resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and 
efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic 
structures and functions (UNISDR, 2009).  Standard operating procedures will not suffice; 
hence having a resilience framework may save a system from a major disruption.  Fur-
thermore, other definitions talk about the ability to emerge stronger from a crisis (Sullivan-
Taylor & Wilson, 2009; Berkeley III & Wallace, 2010). 
 
The situations in which systems are exposed to unexpected dangers vary every time 
and so does its complexity.  There are several factors contributing to the complexity of a 
situation. (Petrenj et al. 2012 based on Lemyre et al., 2011)  
 
● Impact - including the extent, severity and the moment of impact, involve-
ment of the media and political processes. 
● The uncertainty – including elements such as the novelty of the situation, 
anticipation and planning, lack of data/information, new organizations/partners, 
changing rapidly of context, and flexibility of interpretative frameworks. 
● Vulnerability and resilience - which includes elements such as economic de-
velopment, social capital, community competition, information and communica-
tion. 
 
3 INTRODUCTION TO RESILIENCE  
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3.1 From ‘bounce back’ to adaptation 
 
Defining and understanding what resilience is, it is relevant and important for managers 
to enhance and develop resilience in their system. Depending on the system, resilience 
will have a different shape and the accomplishment can be in some cases static and in 
others dynamic. 
 
The static approach, or ‘bounce back’, refers to the ability of systems to return back to 
a normal or functioning state quickly after a disturbance. It is also defined as Recovery 
resilience (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003). Whereas the Precursor resilience, is the more 
dynamic proposal - where adaptation takes place -, and it is seen as a change or transfor-
mation of the system providing the same service or covering the same area as before the 
disturbance (Manyena, 2006; Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003). A resilient system varies and 
adjusts without threatening its essential functioning as a response to internal and external 
change in order to return to equilibrium after an unexpected event (Kahan et al., 2009)   
 
Table 1 makes a comparison between ‘bounce back’ and adaptation including the Re-
silience type, results, temporal span and the entities in which each concept can be applied. 
 
Table 1: Comparison between resilience expressed as bounce back or adaptation. 
(Giroux & Prior, 2012). 
 Bounce Back Adaptation 
Resilience Type Recovery Resilience Precursor Resilience 
Results 
Static outcome, where the ob-
jective is to return to an exist-
ing outcome. 
Dynamic process that results in 
an adaptive response to dis-
turbance. 
Temporal Span Normal function is restablished quickly. 
Longer term; characterized by 
social learning and reflection. 
Application 
Entities or system components 
whose value or service tied to a 
specific function. 
Entities or system components 
whose value lies in the man-
agement and proper function-
ing of systems or system com-
ponents.  
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3.2 Resilient Domains 
Resilience, has been used in five core disciplines representing the domains of a social 
system in order to exemplify these descriptions:  Engineering/Physical, Psychological/In-
dividual, Business/Economic, Ecological and Community (Giroux & Prior, 2012). 
 
- In ecology, resilience can be seen as the ability to absorb the shock, but also 
taking adaptation into account, gaining opportunities of improvement through re-
newal, reorganisation and development (Folke, 2006).  The concept of resilience 
is based on the observation of ecology and its ability to adapt, very well expressed 
by Charles Darwin in 1956. 
“It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most in-
telligent that survives. It is the one that is the most adaptable to 
change.” 
Charles Darwin, On The Origin of Species   
(Darwin, C.R., 1859) 
- A technological system will be considered as resilient once the structures 
are recovered completely after a disturbance (Haimes, 2009).   
 
- In psychology, resilience is defined as the collection of personal characteris-
tics that allow an individual operate normally when facing trauma or adver-
sity.(Bonanno, 2005; Connor & Davidson, 2003; Paton & Johnston, 2006)  
 
- Economic/Business resilience is highly related to Business Continuity Man-
agement defined as ‘a process that identifies an organization’s exposure to internal 
and external threats and synthesises hard and soft assets to provide effective pre-
vention and recovery’ (Herbane, Elliott, & Swartz, 2004). 
 
- And last, community resilience is a matter of adaptation towards disasters 
and natural hazards and can be influenced by the community attributes, such as 
leadership trust, social capital, shared learning, and attachment to place (Paton & 
Johnston, 2006). 
 
Although this approach segregates resilience in five core disciplines, in many cases 
they overlap one and other due to their interconnectedness. 
 
 
 
29 
Introduction to Resilience 
 
3.3 Synergy and Capabilities 
 
As just seen, ecology serves as a model of adaptation, however, Jerome Kahan (Kahan 
et al., 2009) talks more specifically in resilience in human- envolving domains.  Kahan 
mentions that an unavoidable challenge is faced when analysing resilience since such term 
encompasses a wide range of systems with both hard and soft aspects.  Hard resilience 
refers to the structural, technical and mechanical capabilities, capacities and functions of 
institutions and infrastructures.  On the other hand, soft resilience addresses family, com-
munity and society, focusing on behaviours, human needs, relationships and psychol-
ogy.  These two aspects of resilience may be addressed synergistically as they depend on 
each other.  Without institutions and infrastructure people would live a disarrayed and 
precarious life.  In the same way, institutions are meaningless if there is no people.   
 
 
Figure 4: Synergy of Hard and Soft Resilience (Kahan et al., 2009). 
 
Figure 4 shows synergy between hard and soft resilience and reflects the capacities 
individuals, communities, institutions and Infrastructures would enable them to survive 
the impacts of trigger events and to manage the consequences of those assaults.  
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3.4 Resilience lifecycle steps – Resilience via Crisis Man-
agement 
 
Leire Labaka (Labaka, 2013), based on the Crisis Management phases explained above, 
considering resilience being precursor resilience talks about three stages of the resilience 
lifecycle: Prevention, Absorption and Recovery. 
 
● Prevention:  seen as the ability of a system to prevent a crisis occurrence. 
Resilience fights against potential threats that could lead into a crisis.  Awareness 
of the trigger event can avoid a major crisis to occur, while preparedness, including 
activities to deal with unforeseeable (and foreseeable) events, will allow the re-
sponse to be more rapid and effective (Castillo, 2005; Labaka, 2013).  
  
● Absorption:  being the ability to reduce the magnitude of the impact. 
Systems should be able to absorb the impact and avoid bigger damage.  Absorption 
is enlarged thanks to a rapid response obtained with the implementation of the 
activities learned during the preparedness phase (Taback, 1991; Labaka, 2013). 
 
● Recovery:  meaning the ability to recover rapidly and efficiently to the nor-
mal state. The resilient system reduces the time of recovery and the total impact of 
the damage (Taback, 1991; Castillo, 2005; Labaka, 2013). 
  
Figure 5 shows the evolution of crises and the resilience lifecycle approach. 
 
 
Figure 5: Relationship among crisis management phases and resilience lifecycle stages. 
Based on (Labaka, 2013). 
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This chapter describes the more tangible characteristics of Resilient CIs and Resilient 
systems.  Furthermore, it presents resilient policies and sub-policies for CIs. 
4.1 Characteristics of Resilient CIs 
There are several characteristics that help resilience more measurable and tangible.  
Disaster resilience, as described in MCEER is characterized by the following resilience 
characteristics (MCEER, 2006): 
 
• Reduced failure probabilities - likelihood of damage and failures to critical in-
frastructure, systems and components.  
• Reduced consequences from failures - the consequences in terms of loss of 
lives, injuries and negative economic and social impacts.  
• Reduced time to recovery: the time needed to restore a system to normal func-
tioning 
 
In order to enhance the resilience characteristics, MCEER (2006), Berkeley III & Wal-
lace (2010), Labaka (2013), Bruneau et al. (2003) consider four fundamental properties of 
resilience, the 4 R’s: 
 
● Robustness - refers to the strength or the ability of a system to support a given 
stress level without suffering degradation or loss of function or without adapting 
its initial stable configuration (Wieland & Wallenburg, 2012). In other words, 
maintaining critical operations in the face of crisis. 
● Redundancy - the extent to which the elements of the systems are substitutable 
and other elements are capable of satisfying functional requirements during the 
disruption or loss of function providing alternative processes for critical sys-
tems (Giroux & Prior, 2012) 
● Resourcefulness - the ability to skillfully prepare for, respond to and manage a 
crisis or disruption as it occurs.  This includes the identification of courses of 
action, business continuity planning, training, supply chain management, prior-
itizing actions to control and mitigate damage, as well as effectively communi-
cating decisions to the people that will carry them out (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 
4 RESILIENCE IN CRITICAL INFRASTRUC-
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2003; Berkeley III & Wallace, 2010). Hence, Resourcefulness may improve the 
other properties as seen in Figure 6. 
● Rapidity - the capacity to achieve goals and set priorities as quickly and effi-
ciently as possible in order to bounce back to normal operations to reduce the 
magnitude of losses and avoid future disruptions.  Components include care-
fully drafted contingency plans, competent emergency operations, and the 
means to get the right people and resources to the right place (Berkeley III & 
Wallace, 2010). 
 
Figure 6: Sequence of the Resilient Fundamental Properties.  Based on the sequence of 
the NIAC Resilience Construct (Berkeley III & Wallace, 2010) 
4.2 Policies towards more resilient Critical Infrastructures  
In order to enhance resilience, Labaka (Labaka, 2013) determines specific resilience 
friendly policies. Such policies are classified within the four dimensions of resilience: 
Technical, Organisational, Social and Economic (MCEER, 2008; Bruneau et al., 2003). 
We will study Internal Resilience, with the three dimensions included: Technological, Or-
ganisational, and Economic. By implementing these policies, organisations should be able 
to reduce the impact of triggering events. Table 2 presents the adaptation of Wheatley and 
Barnes to Labaka’s resilience policies and combines the definitions of both explanations  
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Table 2: Dimensions and policies of Resilience.  Based on: Labaka, 2013; Wheatley & 
Barnes, 2013. 
Dimension Policy Definition 
Te
ch
ni
ca
l 
re
sil
ie
nc
e 
 
CI design and con-
struction 
It refers to the quality, redundancy, robustness, 
flexibility and the proper level of complexity of 
the CI.  The design should fulfil all safety re-
quirements. 
CI maintenance 
This corresponds to the activities performed peri-
odically in order to guarantee a high reliability 
level in order to withstand incidents and reduce 
the magnitude of the impact and the time to re-
cover. 
CI data acquisition 
and transmission 
system 
Monitoring the state of Cis with quality sensors 
and equipment to supervise and control the CI. 
Public crisis re-
sponse equipment  
It refers to the availability, reliability, mainte-
nance and quality of the emergency equipment in 
order to diminish the impact and ensure safety 
during crises.  
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l  
re
sil
ie
nc
e 
CI capacity for cri-
sis detection, com-
munication and 
analysis 
This policy deals with the preparation and capac-
ity of organisations; management of the crisis 
and coordination with external stakeholders.  
CI workforce train-
ing and commit-
ment 
Workers in CIs must be adequately trained before 
a crisis occurs.  Top managers are responsible of 
promoting resilience values, culture and attitudes 
within the workers.   
First responders 
training 
This corresponds to the preparedness crisis man-
agers have to face a crisis.  This includes training 
and familiarisation of the organisation. 
Government prepa-
ration 
Governments must be prepared to lead and coor-
dinate all the entities while properly communi-
cating the situation to the public and giving ad-
vice in order to reduce public’s anxiety 
Ec
on
om
ic
  
re
sil
ie
nc
e CI crisis budget 
CI should set aside funds in order to cover repairs 
and replacements when a crisis occurs.  This al-
lows the CI to bounce back by reducing their re-
sponse and recovery times 
Public crisis budget 
Public institution should also have funds set aside 
to assist stakeholders and society.  This allows 
first responders, organisations and society obtain 
resources more rapidly. 
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Table 3: Resilience sub-policies. (Adapted from Labaka, 2013). 
Dimension Resilience Sub-policies Supported 
Technical  
resilience 
Redundancy 
Security measures 
Maintenance tasks 
Data acquisition and transmission 
equipment 
Organisational 
resilience 
Emergency management personnel 
training 
Formal structure of roles 
Incidents management 
Operators training 
Coordination among stakeholders 
Understanding of Vulnerabilities 
Organisational learning 
Economic  
resilience 
Crisis response and recovery resources 
 
Using the technical, economic and organisational dimensions and ten policies of resil-
ience, an organisation can increase their resilience level, although the policies must be 
integrated when the design of a new infrastructure starts (Wheatley & Barnes, 2013). In 
infrastructures, implementation during the design phase will ensure the life cycle of the 
asset as builders of such infrastructure may not be interested in considering detailed oper-
ational plans or.  Resilience requirements and policies must be included in contract docu-
mentation. Furthermore, in public infrastructures, regulatory requirements are needed to 
increase the durability of public assets. (Wheatley & Barnes, 2013).  
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Resilience is a valuable aspect in Organisations.  This chapter aims to collect the at-
tributes that Resilient Organisations share.  First, it presents Highly Reliable Organisa-
tions with their common aspects and main characteristics.  Secondly, based on the 
HROs features, Resilient Organisations are defined showing their characteristics and 
focuses on two important aspects of Resilient Organisations:  Communication and Im-
provisation.  Finally, the advantages of having Resilience in Organisations are listed.  
5.1 Highly Reliable Organizations (HRO) 
As described above, HRT is based on High reliability Organizations (HROs) charac-
teristics.  HROs denote organizations that successfully avoid failures while providing op-
erational capabilities under a wide range of environmental conditions. Hence, what makes 
valuable an HRO is the capacity to work under uncertainty. Uncertainty is inherent in all 
technical, social or organizational complex systems. 
One can identify this subset by answering the question, ‘how many 
times could this organization have failed resulting in catastrophic con-
sequences that it did not?’  If the answer is on the order of tens of 
thousands of times, the organization is ‘high reliability’.’  
(Roberts, 1990) 
Bourrier and Rochlin (Bourrier, 2011; Rochlin, 2011) - high reliability theorists - de-
termined that highly resilient organizations share similarities in the organizational design 
and response, and also in language, modes of discourse and problem definitions. The most 
important common aspects are: 
• A high technical competence in all the organization; 
•  An awareness of the key events that must be avoided to happen; 
•  Developed and set procedures and practices that address evolving to avoid 
catastrophic events occurring; 
• A formal structure of roles, responsibilities and reporting relationships that 
can become a decentralized team-based approach to problem solving under 
emergency conditions; 
• A "culture of reliability" that distributes and instills the values of care and 
caution, respect of procedures, care and individual responsibility for the 
promotion of safety throughout the organization. 
5 RESILIENCE IN ORGANISATIONS 
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 Along similar lines, K. Marais, N. Dulac and N. Leveson from Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) summarise the main HRO characteristics in 4 topics. (Marais et al., 
2004): 
  
Goal Prioritization and Consensus 
HRO have to achieve the target of the company while ensuring security. Accomplish 
both goals is difficult most of the times, because safety objectives usually conflict with 
the company’s target (despite, of course, of those companies whose primary target is 
safety; e.g. firefighting teams).  
Sometimes organisations have pressure by stakeholders that may have some interests 
in achieving some goals that clash with security.  Therefore, difficulty arises when the 
organisation has to decide how much risk is admissible (Marais et al., 2004).  
  
Simultaneously Decentralized and Centralized Operations 
As a consequence of this new working system there has been a complete change in the 
hierarchy of these companies. Rigid organizational boundaries and hierarchical structures 
have no place if they want to be a successful HRO. Nowadays organizations have to deal 
with many stakeholders with different objectives, so it is necessary to be able to adapt to 
different circumstances and make collaborative relationships.   
Moreover, in crisis situations where acting quickly is needed, “field-workers” are re-
sponsible to make the right decision and sometimes improvisation takes place. The ability 
to improvise is seen as an integral building block for an effective response by crisis man-
agement scholars, whereas High reliability theorists consider improvisation as ‘the last 
5%’ when everything else fails. In crisis, organizations must gather creatively its resources 
and partners to produce a rapid response to a unique problem. (Boin & Van Eeten, 2013) 
  
HROs focus on training and workshops, since a rapid response is crucial to succeed in 
a crisis. The trainings have to be reiterative and constantly evolving, as crises can vary 
depending on the technology or the system (Marais et al., 2004). 
To react quickly it is also necessary good information sharing within the company.  
Crisis managers face the challenge of making all the participants of the network be on the 
same page in order to coordinate an improvised response. For this, information must be 
collected, commissioned, analysed and shared in real time (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001). 
  
Organisational Learning 
HROs make a depth analysis of past accidents, incidents and near misses in order to 
identify how crisis management can be improved. But it is not enough to learn from the 
past. In the early part of the 20th century, if there was a technical discovery it took an 
average of 30 years to be commercialized.  In the 21st century, the average is only of 2-3 
years, and in many cases the technology is obsolete in 5. (Marais et al., 2004). Because of 
this, some organisations do not have the experience to learn from the past, so they design 
complex simulations and try to avoid accidents through an extensive safety design and 
hazard analysis. 
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Extensive use of Redundancy 
LaPorte defines redundancy as the ‘ability to provide for the execution of a task if the 
primary unit fails or falters’ (LaPorte, 1996). To ensure an effective redundancy it is nec-
essary to carry out an adequate maintenance of the components of the system (Marais et 
al., 2004). 
  
5.2 Adaptability and Awareness 
McManus et al. (McManus et al., 2007) talks about the abilities of awareness and adapt-
ability as key aspects for organisations to be resilient.  Mica Endsley (Endsley, 1995) has 
contributed extensively in the concept of Situation Awareness.  
  
Situation Awareness is a measure of the understanding of the organisation and the 
entire operating environment’s perception.  Situation awareness can be segmented in three 
levels: perception (“noticing”), comprehension, and projection (Endsley, 1995) It includes 
the ability to identify opportunities and potential crises.  On one hand, the impacts may 
occur suddenly and make only one component fail and therefore have a negative impact. 
On the other, small failures in key components may lead to a large scale cascading-type 
failure.  When the crisis arrives, being able of identifying the crisis and its consequences 
accurately.  Organisation must have a clear understanding of the connections between 
components and the vulnerabilities that these might arise.  Furthermore, it provides an 
increased awareness of expectations, obligations and restrictions regarding internal and 
external stakeholders.  And the awareness of the available resources internally and exter-
nally.  Furthermore, having a clear understanding of which are the vulnerabilities of an 
organisation provide them tools to make the system more redundant (McManus et al., 
2007; Tavitiyaman et al., 2007; Haymes, 2009).  
 
Adaptability measures the organisational culture and dynamics that enable such or-
ganisation to make decisions in a well-timed and maximising opportunities. Simultane-
ously centralised and decentralised company combined with good leadership can enhace 
good communication and decision making.  
To adapt better the system is needed as well information and knowledge. Hence, 
awareness of the specific roles within the company, goles, and relationships is a very 
useful tool for adaptation (McManus et al., 2007; Petrenj et al., 2012; Kahan et al. 2009). 
 
All in all, resilience gives the ability to organisations to identify opportunities in the 
most difficult circumstances allowing it to move forward and even grow stronger in times 
of adversity.  To improve both awareness and adaptability are very important the ability 
to communicate properly as well as to improvise in time of crisis. 
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5.2.1 Communication 
It is crucial to have a good communication between the responsibles who make deci-
sions and stakeholders. These measures help organisations make faster decisions, work 
more efficiently and coordinate efforts and activities. The difficulty of coordination in-
creases when more than one organization is involved during a crisis. Joining efforts and 
resources is required to reach common goals and make agreed decisions. (Kapucu, 2012). 
Having a strong communication system becomes one of the biggest challenges that resil-
ient systems face. (Boin & Van Eeten, 2013).   
 
Taylor-Powell, Rossing and Geran (Geran, Rossing & Taylor-Powell, 1998) distin-
guish three top levels of communication: coordination, cooperation and collaboration. 
 
Coordination: is the process where communication, planning and division of roles are 
distributed between two parties or more in order to achieve common or complementary 
targets in a more efficient and effective way. 
 
Cooperation: when two or more parties have shared interests and work jointly to 
achieve shared goals, but maintining separate identities.  
 
Collaboration: is the process where two parties or more have a problem, and they iden-
tify common targets and seek solutions within their differences. It is necessary to share 
information and resources, and organisations may require to be flexible in order to adapt 
to different visions of the problem (Geran, Rossing & Taylor-Powell, 1998). The term 
collaboration between organisations or departments is the highest level of information 
sharing according to the scale made by Murray Turoff (Turoff et al. 2008). 
 
The willingness of organisations to cooperate, coordinate or collaborate during extreme 
events is highly dependent in assets such as; time, information resources, power and au-
thority.  (Lemyre et al., 2011). 
5.2.2 When the Unexpected arrives:  The Importance 
of Improvisation 
It is well known that preparation and planning it is very helpful for crisis response, 
since, as previously mentioned, Critical Infrastructures are such big and complex systems 
makes it impossible to make a crisis plan for any possible scenario. Critical Infrastructures 
are dynamic systems, hence it is necessary to adapt and adjust to every current situation. 
That is why the aptitude to improvise is vital to cope with unforeseen events. A resilient 
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system has the abilities to anticipate, monitor, respond and learn (Hollnagel 2009). From 
this statement it is possible to conclude that resilience is an adaptive process, being im-
provisation one of the key characteristics. 
 
Improvisation constitutes “reworking knowledge to produce a novel action in time to 
meet the requirement of a given situation” (Mendonca et al. 2001). Therefore, it is essen-
tial to have a trained and qualified team, capable to act fast and efficiently. The key point 
of having trained and qualified people in an organization is that those capabilities improve 
the ability to improvise choosing the best decision in every moment. 
 
However, situation, culture and contextual factors are some important aspects to take 
into account when a crisis occurs (Rankin et al., 2013). An organization can facilitate the 
correct use of improvisation with the right structure, culture having the resources available 
among others. 
 
5.2.2.1 Factors that influence improvisation 
 
Language skills and communication 
When a crisis emerge there is the need to coordinate and share information between 
people involved in most of the cases. Therefore, it is necessary to have good ways of 
communication within the company and with other stakeholders that can take part in solv-
ing the crisis. 
Crisis in Critical Infrastructures can affect other countries, hence a clear way of com-
munication and having language skills is necessary. The loss of information sharing within 
a response crisis can lead to worse consequences (Rankin et al., 2013). To avoid the loss 
of information and misunderstandings, information has to be given clear and precisely. 
A proper use of technology can strengthen the good flow of information and monitor-
ing, even though a previous training may be needed. 
  
Domain knowledge 
The lack of knowledge in one field weakens the person/team’s ability to improvise due 
to the communication difficulties.  Having one or more experts in each team makes the 
team have a wider background on the field. Experts know better what to ask and to whom, 
leading to more information flowing into the organization (Rankin et al., 2013).  All in all, 
the lack of knowledge can lead to a wrong information sharing, while on the other hand, 
an expert can share precise and useful information to the right people. Thereby, the lack 
of information can be compensated if there are good ways of communication and a good 
structure within the company, being that it is possible to contact with an expert that is not 
currently in the place of the incident (Crossan et al., 2005). 
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Organizational structure 
Good organizational structure is one of the key aspects to share information and coor-
dinate people and resource during a crisis.  An awareness of the need of the flow of infor-
mation during the performance through the higher strategic, tactical and planning level 
with the operational level has to be in the organization’s culture. In this way, a misunder-
stood or a wrong given information can be detected in early stages. However, information 
should be given quickly in order to respond as fast as possible (Crossan et al., 2005). 
Organizational structure can be more interesting from a resilient point of view because 
can give the abilities in a company to face crisis regardless of who is in charge of the crisis 
in a specific moment. It also enables the information sharing and the roles who have each 
employee (Rankin et al., 2013), so the team can rely on pre-defined structures and roles 
to get things done (Fussell et al. 1998). 
In conclusion, it does not matter how well trained can be a person or a team because 
there will always be unforeseen situations with some specific abilities or knowledge 
needed. To prepare for these situations and be more resilient, organizational structure is 
probably the best way to handle those (Rankin et al., 2013). 
 
5.3 Why is Resilience essential? 
Many businesses are integrating every time more and more resilience objectives into 
their operating models as they see these measures as essential to their long-term profita-
bility.  (Kahan et al., 2009).  Resilience provides organisations the opportunity to create 
an approach that enables them to work both inter- and intra-dependently to ensure the 
continuity of business objectives at the time of trigger events.  David Parsons (Parsons et 
al., 2008) lists a number of actions in which resilience can give competitive advantage to 
organisations after a trigger event: 
 
• Return to pre disruption profits more rapidly; 
• Use the event as an opportunity to improve efficiency; 
• Reduce the cost of the interruption to insurers resulting in reduced insur-
ance premiums; 
• Reduce exposure to losses without insurance; 
• Deny the need for increased regulation to comply with the community ex-
pectations; 
• Improve its reputation; 
• Increase staff morale. 
 
Nevertheless, despite this new way of acting has been growing in the last decades, it 
has not been implemented in all organizations yet. Organizations that set up their crisis 
management based in resilience have to train workers and do workshops in order to im-
prove their ability to make spontaneous and right decisions in crisis situations (Van de 
Walle & Turoff, 2008). 
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Figure 7: Relation between elements of Resilience 
Figure 7 shows that to achieve a good prevention, absorption and recovery it is neces-
sary to have robustness, redundancy, rapidity and resourcefulness in the system. These 
four properties can be obtained by the main characteristics that a resilient organisation 
should have. 
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In order to analyse a mid-term disruption in the Danish railway, an introduction of 
railway transport is done, describing how the European rail sector wants to improve the 
use of rail freight. It provides a deeper analysis of the Danish rail cargo and its competi-
tors. Secondly, the Farris – Sommersted incident is described, highlighting what Banedan-
mark and DB Schenker did before, during and after the incident. To conclude, based on 
what has been described throughout the thesis, a resilient analysis of both companies has 
been done.  
6.1 Transport 
Transport plays a major role in global economy. An efficient transport system is of vital 
importance for the competitive operation of the economy and the mobility of citizens 
(UIC), nationally and globally (PPIAF, 2011) as transport availability can be a boost or a 
barrier to economic development within nations (Rietveld & Bruinsma, 2012).  Transpor-
tation investments link production factors in a network of relationships between consum-
ers and producers to create a more efficient division of production, exploit the geograph-
ical comparative advantage, and provide the tools to expand economies of scale (PPIAF, 
2011). 
 
6.2 Railway: the most efficient solution 
Railway systems move cargo and people within a country and between them. (Baldoni 
et al., 2014) Since disruptions of the railway infrastructure can have a significant negative 
impact on the security and economy of an individual country, the rail transport mode is 
considered as CI (Plant, Young & Krepp, 2013).  There are very high economic interests 
that make the system more vulnerable to attacks.  These vulnerabilities force Railway 
networks to be resilient while promoting safety (Baldoni et al., 2014).   
 
Several stakeholders and players are included in the railway system.  The major stake-
holders, considering the European Union, are:  the European Commission, that defines 
guidelines for railway system integration; European member states, supervisors of the sys-
tem; private and public companies, which manage and implement the infrastructure (e.g., 
Banedanmark) and local communities that benefit from the service to transport passengers 
and goods.  In addition, several players are included: public and private rail transportation 
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companies for freight and people (e.g., DSB or DB Schenker); supply companies; ship-
ping companies; local transportation companies; etc...  The economic interests are very 
high making the system more vulnerable to attacks (Baldoni et al., 2014).  
 
6.2.1 Ecofriendly solution 
At the first United Nations World Summit on Sustainable Development, in 1992 in Rio, 
transport was considered as a key area in order to reduce the effects of climate change.  
However, transport’s greenhouse gas emissions have constantly grown since 1990 (UIC 
& CER, 2008). With climate change as a main concern in economic decision making, rail 
transport becomes the right choice for transportation (UIC). 
 
Railway is the most efficient transport mode with very low environmental impact on 
water and air and positive economic growth.  It offers considerable environmental, land-
use and capital investment benefits.   Modern railways, if managed efficiently, have lower 
emissions per traffic unit (passenger/kilometer or ton/kilometer) than any other mode, e.g.  
CO2 emissions in rail transport are 8 times less than in road (UIC).  Furthermore, many 
railways throughout the world are electrified, which can reduce even more emissions de-
pending on the energy source used to generate electricity (PPIAF, 2011). In conclusion, it 
is the eco-friendly solution for freight transport.   
 
Moreover, railway has several advantages amongst other transport modes:  it is depend-
able, highly organised, allows high speed over long distances and large quantities, it is 
suitable for heavy and bulky good, it guarantees safety, etc (Lowe, 1997; Nierat, 1992; 
Slack, 1998).  For such reasons, freight cargo shipped by train has increased in the last 
years. 
6.2.2 Main competitors of railway transport: road 
Despite the efficiency and environmental advantages, Rail transport is an expensive 
mode of transport.  Rail freight transport costs are generally around 0.120€/tkm.  Price 
may vary according to: government policy choices, management effectiveness, design 
characteristics, and difference in volume, cost structures, commodity mixes, competitive 
environments, haul lengths and geography, among many other factors (PPIAF, 2011). 
 
● Variant 1a - Cargo is transported by route in the entire route on toll loads; 
● Variant 1b - Cargo is transported by road in the main part of the route on toll 
roads (375km), and in the marginal parts of the route on toll-free roads (125 
km); 
● Variant 2 - Cargo is transported by rail in the entire route 
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● Variant 3 - Cargo is transported by combined transport - by rail in the main 
part of the route (500km), and by road on toll-free roads in the marginal parts 
of the route (100km) 
 
 
Figure 8: Comparison of the unit shipping costs for the specific cargo (€/ ton-kilometer).  
Data from (Bína, 2014). 
 
This chart compares the unit shipping costs for the specific cargo determining four 
variants of road and rail with similar movements in several European Countries.   It is seen 
that costs in road movements are considerably lower than costs of movements including 
rail.  Routes with combined transport have the highest shipping cost and the handicap of 
wasting time in changing transport mode.  On the other hand, they combine the advantages 
of both rail and road.  
 
The lower price, higher flexibility and suitability for short distance and small loads, etc 
(Lowe, 1997; Nierat, 1992; Slack, 1998) of trucks makes road the most commonly used 
transport mode.  
 
Companies still choose road as their transportation mode although trucks have a higher 
ecological carbon footprint. Road transport continues to dominate the inland freight 
transport market, with a market share above 75% in the EU compared to an 18.6% for rail 
(Eurostat, 2014).  Changing mode of transportation implies time, resources and costs that 
many companies are not willing to pay despite the benefits of Rail (Möller, 2015). 
 
All Road 
All Toll 
All Road  
Main toll 
All Rail Rail 
main; 
Road 
marginal   
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6.3 Railway in Denmark: Current situation 
The railway is one of the most important and effective ways of travelling and commer-
ciate in Denmark. The Danish railway system, provided by Banedanmark, has 3,103 km 
of railway tracks, where almost 1,2 million trains run every year. In other words, the Dan-
ish railway system transports more than 196 million passengers and 8 million tons freight 
annually (DMOT, 2012). 
 
The wide railway network around Denmark attracts companies to ship their cargo by 
train. Considering that the sum of imports and exports in 2010 was the 57% of the Danish 
GDP, infrastructures related to trade become essential in Danish economy (DMOT, 2012). 
 
Domestic freight transport is carried out basically by lorries and ships (165 million 
tons), while railway and air transport have a secondary role (less than 0.5% of goods meas-
ured in tonnes). 
 
 
Figure 9: Domestic freight transport divided by type of transport (DMOT, 2012). 
 
On the other hand, in terms of international transport goods, although lorries (national 
or foreign) and ship still are the main way of trading (99 million tones), trains have a very 
important role in this scenario.  
 
Figure 10: International transport goods by transport type (DMOT, 2012). 
 
48 
Case Study 
In relation to railway freight, around 2,000,000 tones are carried every quadrimester.  
However, only 25% of the cargo is shipped to and from Denmark whereas the other 75% 
of the total is transit traffic, which is transported through the two main rail transport cor-
ridors of the country. These corridors connect Denmark with its neighbouring countries.  
One vertical axis, between the South of Jutland connecting with Germany and the North-
ern part of Jutland where it links up by ferry to Norway and Sweden.  Furthermore, there 
is a west-east transversal axis going from the West of Jutland to Sweden linking the dif-
ferent regions of Denmark through the Little Belt Bridges and the Great Belt Bridge 
(DMOT, 2012). 
 
 
Figure 11: Transport corridors in Denmark (DMOT, 2012). 
 
The amount of cargo shipped through Denmark is expected to increase in the next years 
due to the ScanMed Rail Freight Corridor. ScanMed is an initiative that propose to create 
one of the biggest rail freight corridors in Europe, connecting Scandinavia and the Medi-
terranean Sea through Stockholm - Malmö - Copenhagen - Hamburg - Innsbruck - Verona 
- Palermo. Banedanmark is one of the Infrastructure Managers involved in the project. For 
the time being, the Implementation Plan has to be presented to the EU-Commission before 
the 10th November 2015 (ETC, 2014)  
 
All in all, the railway network and its functionality become a very important aspect in 
the Danish lifestyle and economy. Therefore, a disruption in a rail track can affect many 
people and can cause economic losses or even become a major accident if the involved 
trains transport dangerous goods (3% of the total rail freight). In order withstand or avoid 
disruptions, Banedanmark, freight companies and other interested organizations should be 
resilient.  
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6.3.1 Looking to the furture: Implementing ERTMS 
 
Banedanmark has committed an ambitious plan: upgrade its total network of “main 
lines” with ERTMS Sygnalling System (Appendix C) for 2024 (ERTMS, 2014 i). The 
current signaling system in Denmark is obsolete, since some of them date back to the 
1930s. Such system has been causing many problems that provoke more than 50% of train 
delays, and the system was considered to life-expired by 2020. Therefore, there was a need 
to modernize, and the Danish Government decided to adopt a global system. Banedanmark 
is implementing the ERTMS (ERTMS, 2014 i) to: 
 
• Simplify the national network; 
• Reduce the life cycle and maintenance costs; 
• Reduce of staff; 
• Simplify and update the national operating rules; 
• Optimize the national control organization; 
• Increase safety levels; 
• Allow high speed train movements; 
• Increase network capacity; 
• Improve punctuality; 
 
All in all, the major benefits expected (beside the ones explained above) are to see an 
80% reduction in train delays and a possible 25% reduction in maintenance costs 
(ERTMS, 2014 i).  Furthermore, the ERTMS Sygnalling System will also benefit the rail-
way stakeholders (both freight companies and Banedanmark) as it is very useful for dis-
ruption management.  ERTMS will help the organisations the resilient features will be 
increased. 
6.4 Farris - Sommersted incident 
 
The information about the incident has been obtained from Banedanmark Press 2012.  
(Banedanmark, 2012). 
 
“On Thursday Nov 29th 2012 one or more wagons in a freight train 
run by Hectorrail (HG 45685) was derailed in the stretch between 
Farris and Sommersted.  Up to 7 kilometers of track was destroyed 
and around 11000 sleepers urge to be replaced.” – Banedanmark 
Press (Banedanmark, 2012) 
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The incident was a very rare event (Jensen, 2015; Hansen, 2015).  Rare events are 
events that occur outside the everyday experience of an organisation and are seen as 
unique, unprecedented, or even uncategorizable (Roux-Dufort, 2007; Starbuck and 
Farjoun, 2005). 
 
Organisations learn through rare events, these reveal organisations weaknesses and ex-
pose unrealised behavioral potential.  Interpreting, relating and re-structuring are critical 
to both learning and responding as they increase understanding and reduce the ambiguity 
caused by the rare event.  The incident was a major disruption as the incident had im-
portant consequences for the involved stakeholders and more specifically to the freight 
owners.  
 
The derailment, which cause has not been identified yet, happened in one of the main 
railway lines of Denmark. With normal traffic, 2 trains per hour for passengers (336 trains 
per week), and for DB Schenker 200 freight trains per week.  The rail track goes through 
the East of Jutland and connects the country with the north of Germany (Lunderskov-
Padborg).  See Figure 12. 
 
 
Figure 12: Railways in Syddanmark, Denmark. (Banedanmark a) 
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All traffic was interrupted between Vojens and Vamdrup (See red cross in Figure 12) 
causing comprehensive problems for freight companies to and from Denmark.  Passenger 
trains were replaced the day after the incident, 30th November, with buses following the 
same route (Passenger buses in Figure 13) 
 
Cooperation with many stakeholders (freight operators, cargo terminal operators, Rail 
Net Denmark colleague companies in Germany and Sweden, such as Stena Line and DB 
Netz, Ministry of Transport and Arriva) was needed to offer alternative routes (Alternative 
Routes in Figure 13).  The Strategy team had the allocation plans ready 12hrs after the 
incident (Planning in Figure 13).  However, it took 36hrs for the Operations Center to 
implement the plans in order to allocate the cargo (Implementation in Figure 13).  
 
At the same time, maintenance work was initiated in order to repair the damage. Such 
maintenance included the replacement of 11,000 sleepers, completion and replacement in 
the points in Farris, adjustment to the 7 km railway line, adjustment of the traction power 
and security installations. 
 
Moreover, the winter season added a handicap for the restoration of the tracks.  
Banedanmark does not usually plan track conversions during the winter season due to the 
heavy storm and the low temperatures.  For instance, the 11,000 sleepers had to be re-
placed manually due to the poor condition of the track. 
 
Despite the challenges, Banedanmark managed to finish the repair 4 days before the 
initial expectation. The track was released for traffic on Saturday, December 15th at 
14.00pm, and the first freight train run on the line later that afternoon (Normal traffic 
resumed in Figure 13).  Passenger traffic between Vojens and Vamdrup started Sunday 
16th of December in the morning (Passenger trains in Figure 13). 
 
The rail tracks are owned by Banedanmark and Hectorrail and DB Schenker are the 
two main freight companies operating in this line.  The two companies suffered from this 
interruption as Hectorrail cancelled all operations during the disruptions and DB Schenker 
had to reduce the capacity shipped during those days. 
 
Interviews to the main representatives of Banedanmark and DB Schenker will be held 
in order to determine the measures they took and to analyse the resilience capabilities of 
the companies.  Passenger companies will not be considered as people can be easily relo-
cated with buses providing the same service. 
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Figure 13: Gantt chart of the Farris incident. 
 
Figure 13 shows the evolution of the incident.  The Planning and Implementation phase 
form part of the Absorption stage of Resilience.  The managers had to find a solution and 
implement it as soon as possible in order to reduce the impact of the disruption to the 
involved stakeholders (e.g. loss of customers for freight companies or uncomfortability 
for passengers).  
 
During he Recovery stage the plans were implemented and the customers were already 
using the alternative routes that Banedanmark provided.  However, the capacity was still 
below the state of normalcy. 
 
Finally, when the damaged tracks were replaced, passenger and freight trains could use 
the main line again at full capacity.  During this stage, all the lessons learnt were analysed 
and some were applied in order to improve the reaction if a similar accident happens. 
 
6.4.1 Alternative routes  
 
While the tracks were replaced, Banedanmark provided the involved freight companies 
with alternative routes and such freight companies were then responsible of choosing the 
most suitable option for them.  
 
Cargo was transported in three ways: On one hand,  through the parallel railway, yet 
local line, in the West of Jutland that connects Denmark to Germany through the cities of 
Tønder (54° 56′ 34″ N, 8° 51′ 50″ E) and Niebüll (54° 47′ 17.16″ N, 8° 49′ 46.56″ E).  
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Nonetheless, the western line of Denmark could only carry around 50% of the capacity of 
the Eastern line, as there are several restrictions on weight, length, etc. 
 
On the other hand, cargo was transshipped between road and rail in the intermodal 
terminals in the cities of Taulov (55° 33′ 0″ N, 9° 37′ 0″ E), located in the Triangular Area 
of Jutland, and Padborg (54° 49′ 22″ N, 9° 21′ 21″ E), located in the southern part of 
Jutland and very close to the Danish-German border. 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Alternative routes. 
 
Finally, Stena Line, the Swedish international ferry service company shipped extra 
goods to and from Germany through the connection Trelleborg-Rostock.  The ship has 
1120 lane meters for rolling stock which allows a capacity of up to 3330 tonnes of railway 
stock.  
 
6.4.2 Banedanmark 
Banedanmark is a public company responsible of providing a safe, attractive and effi-
cient infrastructure for the railway in Denmark. It also provides the monitoring and traffic 
information for passengers and railway companies. (Banedanmark b) 
 
After studying Banedanmark’s core processes and based on information obtained first-
hand from the interviews to Martin O. Jensen (Deputy Director of Traffic Operations of 
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Banedanmark during the Farris incident) and Jens Jorgen Hensen (Traffic Manager of 
Banedanmark) an analysis of the company has been done to describe the organisation in 
terms of HRO characteristics (Marais et al., 2004). 
 
Goal Prioritization and Consensus 
Banedanmark’s objective is to offer a good service of tracks in the Danish geographical 
area while ensuring security.  In a wide network like the rail network, it can be difficult to 
accomplish both goals and ensure perfect conditions of the tracks throughout the whole 
area.  However, Banedanmark can guarantee all the quality certificates because they carry 
out maintenance tasks. (Hansen, 2015; Jensen, 2015)  (Seen in Appendix D) 
 
Both passenger (e.g. DSB) and cargo companies (e.g. DB Schenker or Hectorrail) 
should be benefitted equally from Banedanmark’s services.  However, the theoretical goal 
may be altered as Banedanmark puts more attention to passenger trains and their com-
modities as there are political interests involved.  In denser areas, where there are more 
inhabitants, such as the Metropolitan area of Copenhagen and around - Sjaelland Region 
- the rail tracks are in better condition and are usually comprised of a double track.  In 
contrast, in the Syddanmark region and more extensively the Midtjylland and Nordjylland 
region, there is a lack of rail tracks and the existent ones are more vulnerable (Hansen, 
2015). 
 
The importance given to freight trains has increased in the last years due to the fluent 
communication established between the Traffic Manager in Banedanmark, Jens Jorgen 
Hansen, and the Head of Operations at DB Schenker, Henrik Möller Larsen (Hansen, 
2015). Banedanmark has determined a new settlement of freight traffic to ensure high 
punctuality of freight trains in transit through Denmark by having more coordination with 
the different stakeholders (See Appendix E).  
 
Simultaneously Decentralized and Centralized Operations 
Due to the rareness of the Farris incident, there was no previous plan for a situation like 
that.  Banedanmark has a well-defined chain of command with defined roles and respon-
sibilities that made possible to improvise a new plan. Or as the Chief of Operations calls 
it, ‘improvisation within the plans’ (Hansen, 2015) as they use the information in already 
established plans and prepare a new one and determine how to allocate the cargo.  
When the Farris incident occurred, the planning team started working right when the 
accident happened and were able to start the allocation process 24 hours later. “It hap-
pened Thursday night and my staff and I were working throughout the night and we al-
ready knew how to reroute the traffic by Friday morning, which I think that is a quite fast 
response” - said Martin Jensen, previous Deputy Director of Traffic Operations in 
Banedanmark (Jensen, 2015). 
 
The planning team is highly qualified, they have different backgrounds and university 
studies which allow them to act rapidly.  Thanks to the quality of the team, they are able 
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to adapt the CPs to each unforeseen incident in a very efficient way.   During a disruption, 
executors gather in the Operations room and see what needs to be done in order to imple-
ment the new plans.  Operational workers are experts as to get to the control room they 
have previously worked in all ranks and levels. 
  
Last but not least, communication in an inter- and intra-organisational level must be 
strengthened.  Information sharing within the company is not too smooth (Hansen, 2015) 
and it is one of the biggest challenges resilience systems face (Boin & Van Eeten, 2013).   
Crisis managers are in charge of making all the participants of the network be on the 
same page, (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001) this is a challenge as the personnel is used to keep 
the information to themselves.  This problem is due to many years of lack of information 
sharing.  Moreover, the planning team does not participate in the implementation phase, 
communication between planners and operational staff should be more fluent in order to 
create plans that can be implemented smoothly during a crisis (Hansen, 2015). 
In contrast, there is a good communication in an operationally underground level (be-
tween the Infrastructure Management Operator and the train Operator Company) espe-
cially after incidents occur when there is a 24/7 coverage. (Hansen, 2015) 
The Traffic Manager puts a lot of effort in making the personnel understand that infor-
mation must be shared in real time (Hansen, 2015)  in order to coordinate an improvised 
response (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001).  
 
Organisational Learning 
In order to identify how crisis management can be improved and improve their plans 
and practices Banedanmark makes analysis of past accidents, incidents and near misses 
following a trial and error practise.   Banedanmark has a clear awareness of the flaws and 
vulnerabilities of the areas that must be improved.  Awareness is an important feature of 
resilient organisations (McManus et al., 2007). 
 
As Banedanmark learns by acting, when a disruption occurs and if there is a chance 
that it could happen again, they prepare a new Contingency plan for a similar situation.  A 
clear example are the two consecutive storms that occurred in 2013.  During the first one, 
St. Jude Storm, 28th October 2013, passengers were stuck in the trains as almost 500 trees 
fell on the tracks, DSB expected losses of at least 5 million kroner as 25 trains were dam-
aged. Banedanmark expected losses between 5 and 7 million kroner (DR, 2013). However, 
two weeks later, there was a new storm, Bodil, Danish name (Brandt, 2013), and it was 
successfully managed.  Banedanmark learned from the first storm and applied the lessons 
learnt; all trains were cancelled during the afternoon in order to avoid having people stuck 
in the trains due to the storm (Ertman, 2013).  In addition, the Planning department wrote 
a new Contingency Plan that is now available to use in further Storm situations (Hansen, 
2015).  Anyhow, if the chances of a disruption to happen again are extremely low, as in 
the Farris incident that was such a rare event, Banedanmark does not develop new CP for 
similar disruptions.   
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Leaders should keep their organisations in motion.  Although organisations cannot an-
ticipate rare events, they can work to widen their response repertoire for dealing with dis-
ruptions (Lampel, Shamsie & Shapira, 2009).  Martin O. Jensen, suggested that more 
‘what if’s’ situations should be considered.  The more ‘possible situations’ that have been 
considered, the more prepared the organisation will be towards a disruption.  In the plan-
ning area, there should also be more effort in designing specific plans for medium and 
long disruptions.  (Jensen, 2015) 
 
Communication is another aspect that must be improved.  The Farris-Sommersted in-
cident strengthened the ability to communicate in a higher level between departments in 
the German rail companies.  Since the incident, Banedanmark knows better who to call on 
a strategic level.  They have a list of contacts in every level, functions or offices (Hansen, 
2015; Jensen, 2015) When a crisis happens, it is very useful in order to increase rapidity. 
 
Extensive use of Redundancy 
Denmark does not have a widely meshed rail network but there are only a few main 
lines as seen in Appendix B.  If there is a disruption in the main line in Jutland, the use of 
the parallel, yet local line, is not an easy alternative given the different regulations and 
limitations of the west coast line.  Alternatives to re-routing trains can be a difficult task.   
Therefore, more specific plans should be developed to be able to act immediately in case 
of a disruption in an important line (Møller, 2015; Hansen, 2015). 
 
Nonetheless, after the Farris incident, Banedanmark started a project of building a dou-
ble track in that line in order to be more redundant and therefore more resilient.  It will be 
finished this year (Hansen, 2015).  Furthermore, implementing ERTMS to the network 
will also make the system more redundant. 
 
In addition, one of the most complex issues to handle is that operators and resources 
may not be linked to the Contingency Plan (CP) and personnel may be in locations far 
from where they are needed.  The lack of resourcefulness may restrict a CP from being 
implemented (Hansen, 2015). ERTMS will also help with this issue (ERTMS, 2014 i).  
 
Once defined the case and studying one of the ways of characterizing the HROs, an 
analysis of the Resilience principles of the company has been done in the moment of the 
accident and nowadays (after applying the lessons learned from the accident). First, the 
four main characteristics of resilience (4R’s) that have been described in Chapter 4: Ro-
bustness, Redundancy, Resourcefulness (e.g. MCEER, 2006; Berkeley III & Wallace, 
2010; Labaka, 2013); Bruneau et al., 2003). Second, other four features have been in-
cluded due to their influence during the disruption. Situation Awareness (e.g. Endsley, 
1995; McManus, 2007)); Adaptability (e.g. Hollnagel, 2009; Marais et al., 2004); leader-
ship and information sharing (Rankin et al., 2013; Crossan et al. 2005). Although improv-
isation is a very important aspect to take into account, as explained before, is a conse-
quence of other properties within the company. 
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Table 4: Presence of Resilience Characteristics in Banedanmark before the Farris inci-
dent. 
Resilience  
Principles Prev. Abs. Rec.  
Robustness ± ±  
They have good maintenance and offer qual-
ity certifications, but the rail tracks need to 
be updated. 
Redundancy  ✗ ✗ 
The network is very simple, they do not have 
alternative routes if an incident happens in 
the main lines.  
Resourcefulness ± ✓ ✓ 
P: Lack of “what if’s” situations. 
P&A&R:  Highly qualified personnel able to 
skilfully manage a disruption despite the lack 
of training via simulations. 
Rapidity  ± ✓ 
A: The planning was done in 12 hrs but the 
implementation took 36 more hours due to 
the lack of experience in mid-term disrup-
tions 
R: It took less than expected to fix the rail 
tracks. 
Information 
sharing  ± ✓ 
A: Slow initial contact with the German au-
thorities and misunderstandings due to the 
difference in terminology and lan-
guage.  Personnel are not used to share infor-
mation in real time in the Operations Room. 
R: Good communication with DB Schenker. 
Adaptability ✓ ✓ ✓ 
P: They adapt to the environment, e.g. in 
Winter.  
A: They made new plans of capacity alloca-
tion for this disruption. 
R: They hired more workers during the dis-
ruption. 
Leadership ± ✓ ✓ 
P: Lack of communication between depart-
ments during the implementation of CPs. 
P & A & R: They are very qualified and ca-
pable to lead their teams.  
Awareness ✓ ±  
P: With their monitoring and control systems 
they are able to avoid possible incidents. 
They are also conscious of their flaws and 
weaknesses of the system.  
A: They were not aware of all the complica-
tions of changing routes.    
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Table 5: Presence of Resilience Characteristics in Banedanmark after applying the les-
sons learnt.  
Resilience  
Principles Prev. Abs. Rec. 
 
 
Robustness ± ±  Idem. 
Redundancy  ± ± They have updated lines with double tracks, but the network is still small. 
Resourcefulness ± ✓ ✓ Idem 
Rapidity  ± ✓ 
They have improved external infor-
mation sharing and know how to use 
better the western line of Jutland.  
Information 
sharing  ✓ ✓ 
A: Good contact list of the German au-
thorities. Personnel are putting more ef-
fort in sharing information in real time 
in the Operations Room. 
R: Good communication with DB 
Schenker. 
Adaptability ✓ ✓ ✓ Idem 
Leadership ± ✓ ✓ Idem 
Awareness ✓ ✓  
P: With their monitoring and control 
systems they are able to avoid possible 
incidents. They are also conscious of 
their flaws and weaknesses of the sys-
tem.  
A: They are aware of all the complica-
tions of changing routes.    
 
Based on the Labaka’s Resilience policies that promote resilience in organisations so 
that these are able to reduce the impact of triggering events stated in Chapter 4, Resilience 
in Banedanmark is going to be examined: 
 
Technical Resilience 
Banedanmark has a high technical resilience.  The maintenance activities performed 
periodically guarantee a high reliability and help withstand possible impacts.  Around 800 
employees are responsible of the maintenance. The maintenance services are divided in 3 
staff units in charge of 4 different areas as seen in Appendix D. 
 
Moreover, the network is monitored and the trains on the tracks are constantly super-
vised in the control room. 
 
Resilience is achieved by being able to both "bounce back" and to adapt. In case of 
accident, Banedanmark has the responsibility to fix the railroad tracks in an effective and 
efficient way to return to “normal” operation as soon as possible. On the other hand, 
Banedanmark is in continuous adaptation. Being aware of the flaws and vulnerabilities 
59 
Case Study 
 
that it has, Banedanmark is constantly working to improve the network of train tracks. The 
Signaling System (ERTMS, 2014 i) that will be applied to the entire network of the coun-
try and the construction projects of double tracks in various sections of the network 
(Bane.dk) will make the network more robust and redundant. Banedanmark wants to be 
prepared for any accident and it is aware that a good way to achieve that goal is to improve 
the network infrastructure. This adaptability is a valuable characteristic in resilient organ-
izations  
 
Organisational Resilience 
Teams are highly qualified, especially in the higher level departments: Control, Oper-
ations and Strategy/Management. Chief Managers are responsible of promoting resilience 
values, culture and attitudes between workers (Labaka, 2013). Traffic Manager, Jens 
Jorgen Hansen is putting a lot of effort in promoting those. 
 
The employees have very defined ranges and everyone knows what to do in normal 
situations and when accidents occur.  They have access to numerous CPs although these 
are just for short term disruptions.  During crises, their expertise allows the team to adapt 
to new situations. In contrast, changing workers habits with the goal of improving resili-
ence (e.g. improving information sharing) can be a challenge for the top managers (espe-
cially in the Control room). Most of the employees in the Control room have been working 
for the company for many years which can be a handicap as they are used to work in a 
specific way (Hansen, 2015).   
 
There is a lack of training through workshops and simulations for all employees of 
Banedanmark (Jansen, 2015). Training helps the workers respond in a more rapid way, 
which is crucial to succeed in a crisis but also helps to minimize the probability of acci-
dents (Perrow, 1984).  It is one of the main characteristics of a Resilient Organisation 
(Labaka, 2013). Banedanmark will have a simulations room in the new offices, where 
training will be able as a support to the learning from trial and error method, which is 
currently used (Hansen, 2015). 
 
There is a lack of training through workshops and simulations for all employees of 
Banedanmark, with which Organisational Resilience could be strengthened.    
 
Finally, the lack of information sharing within Banedanmark may cause misunder-
standings and lack of “smoothness” during a crisis.  Resilience is achieved with a good 
communication within the company and with external authorities and companies (Labaka, 
2013). This communication should also be improved in order to have more flexibility 
when disruptions involving more than one country happen (Hansen, 2015). 
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Economic Resilience 
Banedanmark is a public company, therefore when a crisis occurs there should be funds 
available to cover repairs and replacements in the tracks in order to be resilient (Labaka, 
2013).  The bounce back is faster as first responders, and organisations obtain resources 
more rapidly (Labaka, 2013). 
 
Moreover, Banedanmark has a clause that specifies that losses and costs caused to the 
Train Operators companies will be absorbed by the affected company (Jensen, 2015). 
Therefore, Banedanmark is only responsible for the reparation of the tracks.  This agree-
ment makes Banedanmark more resilient as all the funds are invested in the network.  
 
 
Table 6: Resilience Sub-Policies in Banedanmark. 
Dimension Resilience Sub-policies Supported Status 
Technical  
resilience 
Redundancy ✗ 
Security measures ✓ 
Maintenance tasks ✓ 
Data acquisition and trans-
mission equipment ✓ 
Organisational 
resilience 
Emergency management 
personnel training ± 
Formal structure of roles ✓ 
Incidents management ± 
Operators training ± 
Coordination among stake-
holders ± 
Understanding of Vulnera-
bilities ✓ 
Organisational learning ✓ 
Economic  
resilience 
Crisis response and recov-
ery resources ✓ 
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6.4.3 DB Schenker 
DB Schenker Rail Scandinavia is the production company in the Danish part of Eu-
rope’s largest rail freight carrier. It is responsible for the daily production of the company’s 
many freight trains which travel between destinations in Denmark or contribute to con-
necting Scandinavia with the rest of Europe. (DB Schenker a, 2015) 
 
In order to analyse DB Schenker structure and mindset, a deep study of the organisation 
has been done based on the HROs characteristics. This deep analysis it is possible thanks 
to Henrik Møller Larsen, Head of Operations of DB Schenker Rail Scandinavia A/S. 
 
Goal Prioritization and Consensus 
DB Schenker’s main objective is the satisfaction of their customers providing high 
quality and reliable services through the best rail network in Europe (DB Schenker b, 
2015).  However, it is not possible to always provide the same services to every customer. 
Therefore, DB Schenker has two criteria of prioritization: 
  
• Have a reliable network: a fluent and not-congested network is necessary 
to make the system work properly. 
• Importance of the customer: in the case that having all the rails available 
(e.g. the Farris-Sommersted case) is not possible, the company has to pri-
oritize depending on the customer. 
  
Hence, DB Schenker has pressure from part of its customers in order to prioritize their 
own needs. DB Schenker has to deal with this pressure and try to organize their resources 
to be as much efficient as possible in front of their customers. In order to achieve these 
goals, the company has good and continuous communication with their stakeholders.  
They are honest with the customers in order to gain reliability towards them (Lemyre et 
al., 2011). 
  
Even though the state of the rail tracks does not depend on DB Schenker, they have to 
care about safety too. That is why the company has implemented the Safety Management 
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System (SMS), in order to identify hazards and improve safety. SMS segments four codes 
of importance for a situation based on the probability of the event and its severity: 
• Green: Good functioning of lines 
• Yellow: Planned interruption (e.g. maintenance of the tracks and complete 
closedown of tracks) 
• Orange: Big interruption within the line (e.g. strike in Germany) 
• Red: Complete closure of the line. This code can be activated by the following 
causes: 
 Unplanned and unexpected incident (e.g. Farris-Sommersted inci-
dent). 
 Foreseen incident. Plans can be held in advance and the company 
can be ready for the incident (Møller, 2015). 
  
If there is a foreseen interruption of the network, e.g. a rail strike, as mentioned before DB 
Schenker divide their customers in different levels according to their importance: 
• Level 1: DB Schenker put all its effort to continue its customer operations, 
regardless of the incident. 
• Level 2: Operations are cancelled only if it is a Red mode (complete closure 
of the line) 
• Level 3: When the interruption arrives, the trains designated to this customers 
are cancelled. 
• Level 4: Operations are cancelled before the event occurs (Møller, 2015). 
 
Simultaneously Decentralized and Centralized Operations 
When a disruption occurs, all the parties in the management and operational level know 
how to perform depending on the importance of the situation. Therefore, the Operations 
Center do a priority plan in order to adjust to the allowed capacity and avoid congestions 
in Germany or Sweden, while the head of Operations schedule meetings to plan what it 
should be done and the Sales Department is responsible of contacting with the customers 
(Møller, 2015). Hence, having prepared personnel, improvisation to adapt to any situation 
and communication between stakeholders takes important roles in this circumstances if 
the company wants to stay effective and reliable (Perrow, 1984; Castillo, 2014; Labaka, 
2013; Boin & Van Eeten, 2013; Van de Walle & Turoff, 2008). 
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In the “field-level”, operators as can be train drivers are well trained and perfectly ca-
pable to improvise in a crisis situation. Loco drivers know the rail way, since they have to 
learn it in advance in order to drive the train. Consequently, it is easier for them to manage 
properly any undesired situation (Møller, 2015). Additionally, with the introduction of the 
new signaling system, their level of preparedness to drive the locomotives will increase.  
  
Continuous communication within the company is carried out in all levels, what makes 
possible to perform a good and coordinated response. 
  
All in all, although DB Schenker has a defined chain of command, the organization has 
the ability and the proper personnel to delegate work to the most appropriate person/group 
in a crisis situation (Møller, 2015). 
 
Organisational Learning 
DB Schenker has learned from its past incidents that it is necessary to have plans for 
unforeseen disruptions (Møller, 2015). It is very difficult to have plans for any possible 
incident, but it is easier to recover if there is a fix plan and personnel can adapt to the 
circumstances (Castillo, 2014). The company is aware that improvise from scratch is not 
a good idea, but with training and established plans the personnel can improvise to adapt 
the plans (Møller, 2015). 
  
Moreover, they know that customers who need to transport their goods to other places 
are “loyal” to the system that they are currently using (e.g. trains), until they are not avail-
able any more. In the Farris – Sommersted incident DB Schenker lost customers because 
they had to transport their products by trucks or ships, and after the incident they remained 
in that mode of transport. Hence, it is always better to provide capacity to customers with 
the aim of continue being their freight cargo transporter, than focusing in one big cus-
tomer. Nevertheless, this is a difficult issue to deal with due to their priority goals (Møller, 
2015). 
 
Extensive use of Redundancy 
DB Schenker learned about the importance of having redundancy in the system.  Dur-
ing the Farris incident DB Schenker faced several challenges.  They were not able to use 
the potential capacity of the alternative route.  The main challenge was changing trains 
(from German to Danish) in Tønder.  Now, DB Schenker has an agreement with the 
Danish Ministry of Transport to run German locomotives from Germany to Esbjerg (in 
Western Denmark) if they need so.  By using this alternative they can triple the capacity 
of trains run compared to Tonder, improving this way their redundancy (Møller, 2015). 
This agreement has been established to deal with the summer planned interruption of the 
main line and by applying the lessons learnt in the Farris incident.  
64 
Case Study 
In addition, in the rest of Europe DB Schenker offers its customers access to one of 
the world’s largest rail networks and fleet of trains, becoming leader in rail freight 
transport (DB Schenker, 2013). 
 
Table 7: Presence of Resilience Characteristics in DB Schenker before the Farris in-
cident. 
Resilience  
Principles Prev. Abs. Rec. 
 
 
Robustness ✓ ✓  They have good maintenance and offer quality certifications. 
Redundancy 
 ± ± Highly dependent on the route through 
the main line but they have a large fleet 
of trains available. 
Resourcefulness ± ± ± Employees are highly qualified but lack of previous BC planning. 
Rapidity 
 ± ± They were not able to provide alterna-
tives fast enough which lead to a loss of 
customers, but they kept the largest ones. 
Information 
sharing  ✓ ✓ 
There is constant communication with 
their customers, Banedanmark and 
within the company. 
Adaptability ✓ ± ✗ 
P: Fast adaptation to Banedanmark’s re-
strictions. 
A: New plans of Capacity allocation for 
the new restrictions but with much less 
capacity offered to the customers. 
R: Highly dependent on the route 
through the main line 
Leadership ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Leadership was present during the Farris 
incident as the personnel is highly quali-
fied and with clear role definitions and 
responsibilities. 
Awareness ✓ ✓  
P: With their monitoring and control sys-
tems they are able to avoid possible inci-
dents. They are also conscious of their 
flaws and weaknesses. 
A: They were in contact with Banedan-
mark to know the state of the reparation. 
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Table 8: Presence of Resilience Characteristics in DB Schenker after applying the les-
sons learnt. 
Resilience  
Principles Prev. Abs. Rec. 
 
 
Robustness ✓ ✓  Idem 
Redundancy  ✓ ✓ 
New approval with Transportminister-
ietto run German locomotive through 
Denmark. 
Resourcefulness ✓ ✓ ✓ Idem and with the new Signaling System the drivers will be more qualified. 
Rapidity  ✓ ✓ 
With the new approval with Traf-
ikskursen and the Sygnaling system they 
will be able to provide the services to 
their customers. 
Information 
sharing  ✓ ✓ Idem 
Adaptability ✓ ✓ ✓ 
P: Fast adaptation to Banedanmark’s re-
strictions. 
A: New Capacity allocation plans for 
possible disruptions. 
R: With the new approval with 
Transportministeriet they can provide 
more capacity for their customers in case 
of disruption. 
Leadership ✓ ✓ ✓ Idem 
Awareness ✓ ✓  Idem and will be improved with the new Signaling System. 
 
Technical resilience 
In a mid or long term disruption, like the Farris – Sommersted case, DB Schenker has 
to adapt to the situation immediately after the incident in order to try not to lose customers, 
and then bounce back once the rail tracks are available again. In order to adapt to the 
situation, it is essential to continue providing services to the customers (Møller, 2015). In 
the rest of Europe DB Schenker has a meshed network that make them reliable and capable 
to respond rapidly to a disruption (DB Schenker, 2013). However, in the Farris – Som-
mersted incident, DB Schenker was not able to keep all their customers due to the lack of 
redundancy they had in Denmark in that moment. Moreover, in the alternative route that 
they used in the West of Jutland, they could only run with the 50% of the capacity (Jensen 
2015; Møller, 2015). Nevertheless, their organizational learning awareness make them 
improve the redundancy and resourcefulness of the system in Denmark by having another 
route available if a disruption occurs in the main one (Møller, 2015). 
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DB Schenker transports goods such as chemicals, mineral oil, metals and coal, etc. (DB 
Schenker b, 2015), which forces them to carry out a constant maintenance of their loco-
motives and in continuous contact with the train drivers (DB Schenker c, 2015). Addition-
ally, they want to go one step further being ecofriendly by reducing the amount of CO2 
(DB Schenker, 2014). 
  
Organizational resilience 
Their organizational resilience influenced the rapid communication within the com-
pany and with stakeholders (Wheatley & Barnes, 2013). The continuous information shar-
ing with Banedanmark enables the company to detect short-term crisis (e.g. big storms), 
and be prepared for them (Møller, 2015; Hansen, 2015). As mentioned before, DB Schen-
ker has the Safety Management System that allows them to identify hazards in order to 
improve safety. Furthermore, the company has established plans for the short-term dis-
ruptions, made with the aim to accomplish the goals and priorities of the company. There 
is a clear understanding within the company of the roles that every department should take 
in case of disruption.  If the situation cannot be fixed with their plans, they have qualified 
personnel capable to adapt the system to the circumstances.  Personnel are well trained, 
both in “high” and “field” level. On the other hand, the company does not have plans for 
big and long term disruptions, since those situations are rare and the vulnerabilities are 
many. Although there is an awareness of the importance of such plans, it is very difficult 
to develop plans for any possible situation (Møller, 2015). 
  
With the implementation of the Signaling system, train drivers’ training will be easier, 
and capacity of the rail tracks will increase, thus favoring DB Schenker’s operational ser-
vices (ERTMS, 2014 d). 
  
Economic resilience 
Being one of the biggest transportation and logistics companies in the world makes DB 
Schenker Rail have a revenue in 2014 of 4,863 million euros (DB Schenker b, 2015). That 
allows the company to be prepared in economic terms to face an undesirable situation, and 
being able to provide more resources. Therefore, it is easier to bounce back by reducing 
their response and recovery times (Wheatley & Barnes, 2013). 
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Table 9:  Resilience Sub-Policies in DB Schenker. 
Dimension Resilience Sub-policies Supported Status 
Technical  
resilience 
Redundancy ✗ 
Security measures ✓ 
Maintenance tasks ✓ 
Data acquisition and 
transmission equipment 
✓ 
Organisational  
resilience 
Emergency management 
personnel training 
± 
Formal structure of roles ✓ 
Incidents management ✓ 
Operators training ✓ 
Coordination among 
stakeholders 
✓ 
Understanding of Vul-
nerabilities 
✓ 
Organisational learning ✓ 
Economic  
resilience 
Crisis response and re-
covery resources 
✓ 
 
6.4.4 Discussion 
 
Even though Banedanmark and DB Schenker work jointly to provide an efficient Rail-
way service to society and customers, these two organisations have many differences. For 
instance, both companies have different stakeholders and pressures. On one hand, 
Banedanmark is a public company with no competitors which receives pressure from the 
government. The proper functioning of the passengers’ line is vital for the company. 
Therefore, due to political pressures the company puts more attention on passenger trains 
than to freight trains, since passengers are the ones who vote in elections. On the other 
hand, DB Schenker is a private company with many competitors, not only in the railway 
sector but also in ship, road and air sector. Hence, the level of competitiveness is extremely 
higher, and as a consequence, the level of pressure they endure by stakeholders. 
 
Despite Banedanmark receives pressure from the freight companies, when unforeseen 
disruptions occur, and uncertainty of the evolution of the recovery is present, they choose 
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to be conservative. In this way, they give the impression of being an efficient company 
towards the passengers.  On the other hand, the conservative deadlines of Banedanmark 
may affect negatively DB Schenker depending on the duration of the disruption. Uncer-
tainty can change drastically stakeholders’ decisions during a disruption. In short-term 
disruptions uncertainty is not important as they are very common and freight companies 
will more likely continue with its normal functioning.  Furthermore, uncertainty does not 
affect stakeholders’ way of acting in long term disruptions (if recovery of a long term 
disruption takes 6 or 7 months, it does not make a difference). In contrast, in mid-term 
disruptions, uncertainty is a key aspect to take into account because the variation of dead-
lines can vary completely the way events unfold. If DB Schenker customers’ that moved 
to another way of transport had known the real deadline, maybe they would have contin-
ued operations with DB Schenker. 
 
Comparing the resilient characteristics between companies that do not share the same 
goals is difficult, because the target, structure and circumstances are different. However, 
in general terms we conclude that DB Schenker has a more resilient organisational struc-
ture. Their communication within the company is very good, while Banedanmark should 
improve their organisational resilience by increasing the communication between depart-
ments. However, both companies are aware of their weaknesses, and thanks to their good 
organisational learning they have improved their resilience since the accident. They are 
continuously adapting the system: DB Schenker has improved their redundancy by con-
tracting an alternative route in case of disruption, and Banedanmark is improving the net-
work installing the ERTMS.  
 
Becoming resilient gives to DB Schenker an advantage over its competitors, since 
they can easily adapt to unforeseen disruptions and guarantee reliability. On the con-
trary, Banedanmark has to be resilient in order to offer to society an efficient and reliable 
Critical Infrastructure. Therefore, any Critical Infrastructure owner should be resilient 
for the good of society. 
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 7 CONCLUSION 
 
In order to improve the traditional methods used in Organisations managing Critical 
Infrastructures, the application of resilient features when dealing with major disruptions 
has been studied in this report. 
 
Protection of Critical Infrastructures is a big issue nowadays, which is one the reasons 
such area is in continuous evolution. The traditional techniques to managing crises have 
been shown to be very useful to deal with foreseeable events, however, as they rely on a 
very rigid structure such techniques are unable to cope with the unexpected. Resilience-
based approaches, in contrast, intend to prepare organisations for the unforeseeable by 
enhancing their continuous adaptability.  
 
Moreover, resilience approaches must be adapted to every organization as the willing-
ness of applying resilience may differ according to the organization. It has been found that 
the goals and pressures of public and private organisations influence in their behavior.  
 
In the Danish railway, the main concern of Banedanmark, the major owner of the tracks 
is a public organization, is to provide a reliable and safe network of tracks. However, there 
is a parallel political interest; they prioritize passenger trains as they have the legitimacy 
to decide in the elections. Furthermore, being almost a monopoly, Banedanmark is prob-
ably slower in improving the organization as their interests are safeguarded. 
 
Private organizations, on the other hand, have external pressures. The existence of com-
petitors (rail, road, ship...) that threaten DB Schenker’s profitability as customers may opt 
using another mean of transport. The resilient characteristics help DB Schenker maintain 
its status, provide an outstanding service, be reliable and able to manage any situation, 
especially when unexpected disruptions occurs, as they can emerge stronger and be one 
step ahead of competitors.  
 
Sometimes, as in the Farris incident, unexpected disruptions may be useful to present 
organisations their weaknesses. In the two companies studied, it has been shown that in a 
long term view it was beneficial. They have both improved several aspects of the organi-
zation’s resilience. Banedanmark now has a beter knowledge of the main rail owner in 
Germany. DB Schenker, is aware of the limitations of the alternative routes and has an 
approved permission from the Danish Government to use the alternative routes if needed.  
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After finding the advantages and weaknesses of Banedanmark and DB Schenker, the 
future work could be focused in implementing tangible resilient processes in order to im-
prove their weaknesses. 
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 A  IMPORTANCE OF NATIONAL AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS TO ENSURE RESILIENCE 
The following information is based on the National Infrastructure Advisory Council 
(US), (NIAC, 2009). 
 
Protection of Critical Infrastructures is a matter that especially concerns both owners 
and operators of CIs (who can be private companies) and the government, since the dis-
ruption in any of them can affect all the society. That leads society and owners of Critical 
Infrastructures to have a resilient mindset in the organizations to face an all-hazard envi-
ronment. The main objective of resilience in Critical Infrastructures is to deliver the goods 
of the infrastructure by reducing the magnitude and/or duration of any adverse event by 
absorbing, adapting or recovering from it. 
 
Resilience is a tool to be reliable and redundant, therefore organizations are motivated 
to be resilient. That is why owners and operators of CIs are paying attention to identify 
operational risks and cross-sector risk. An incident in a specific CI can affect directly to 
another CI sector. Considering that every owner is the most qualified to prepare internally 
for possible disruptions, all sectors should work together in order to share information 
and prepare internally for possible disruptions and provide to each other needed services. 
This way, a more redundant global system will be acquired.  
 
However, interconnection and complexity of the CIs system make it very difficult to 
organizations to foresee all consequences of any disruption in another sector to their own 
business, since many of the possible scenarios and impacts will be based on past experi-
ence.  
 
Government should play an important role in protecting Critical Infrastructures. They 
are the ones who have to bridge the gap between public and private sector. There are some 
areas where the government should encourage the private operators to achieve resilient 
goals, even though the market forces may not support this achievement because it is not 
economically profitable.  
 
All in all, the National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) of the United States 
have summarized in 6 findings and recommendations how resilience in CIs should be 
strengthened. 
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1) Fortify Government Policy Framework to Strengthen Critical Infrastructure Re-
silience 
First, a clear definition of resilience is needed to have a basis to strengthen it. Secondly, 
public and private sector have to work jointly to find which areas need some incentives 
and then start a dialogue between owners and operators and the government. Private sec-
tor has to perceive that the government is involved receiving mechanisms to support re-
siliency practices. The government should also stimulate of fund maintenance and sus-
tainability, thereby showing their commitment to resilience.  
A national framework for coordinated planning, prioritization and performance should 
be developed in order to be able to achieve pre-established goals. These goals can be 
employee and public health and safety, environment protection, etc.  
 
2) Improve Government Coordination to Enhance Critical Infrastructure Resilience 
To support the established resilience goals, the government should coordinate and 
solve disputes between regulatory agencies that are responsible of the regulation of Crit-
ical Infrastructures.  
 
3) Clarify Roles and Responsibilities of Critical Infrastructure Partners 
If a disruption occurs in a CI, a clear structure of how recovery efforts and resources 
will be addressed, and by whom is needed. Leaders from both government and CIs owners 
and operators should be continuously communicating and sharing information in order to 
guide response actions, as well as being able to ongo business activities and provide the 
services of each sector.  
However, this communication should be done before and after the incident too, with 
the aim of prepare unforeseen incidents and learning about previous ones. A useful way 
to learn from past events is being able to monitor as much as possible.  
 
4) Strengthen and leverage public-private partnership 
Development of resilience is only achieved by mutual collaboration between public 
and private organizations. It cannot be improved just with stringent regulations, but with 
bidirectional communication. This can only be accomplished with a government capable 
to adapt to each sector’s needs, and flexible to coordinate efforts toward improving resil-
ience.  
Senior leadership is a useful tool to enhance executive relationships, set priorities, and 
ensure cross-sector collaboration during crisis situations. Government should take an im-
portant role ensuring high-level relationships between different sectors.  
 
5) Encourage Resilience Using Appropriate Market Incentives 
There are sectors such as water, energy or telecommunications that requires high levels 
of resilience due to market mechanisms. On the other hand, there are sectors where the 
economic costs of ensuring resilience may exceed the predicted benefit. The government 
should give a push to resilience practices in these situations by tax incentives or increasing 
funding for repair and maintenance.  
82 
Importance of national and local Governments to Ensure Resilience 
 
6) Implement Government Enabling Activities & Programs in Concert with Critical 
Infrastructure Owners and Operators 
As each sector and organization understand better which are their specific risks and 
cross-sector vulnerabilities, government should bridge a gap between sectors and identify 
interdependencies and improve preparedness, and make all the findings and practices 
available to all related sectors. 
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B RAILWAYS IN DENMARK 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Railways in Denmark. (Banedanmark a) 
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C ERTMS: BOOSTING THE USE OF RAIL 
THROUGH EUROPE 
In order to increase the use of trains around Europe, in the early 1990s the European 
Rail industry boosted the European Railway Traffic Management System (ERTMS) to 
develop a common signaling system for Europe (ERTMS, 2014 c). This Signaling Pro-
gram allows the railway sector to become a true competitor to roads.  Nowadays, there 
are several constraints, especially for rail freight, that prevent this sector to be more 
widely used. Different electrification systems or administrative procedures and more than 
20 legacy signaling systems in Europe among other limitations make the cross-border 
traffic for trains complex and difficult to manage (ERTMS, 2014 a).  
 
Rail freight operators suffer this lack of a unified signaling system in Europe. In the 
past, each country or supplier tended to develop its own signaling system, and these sys-
tems were not interoperable between countries (ERTMS, 2014 c). This situation forces 
locomotives to be changed at each boundary or need to be equipped with the appropriate 
signaling system (ERTMS, 2014 a). Therefore, the driver’s cab must have a screen for 
each signaling system - especially in locomotives designed for long-distance freight - 
which has a bad impact on the ergonomics of the Driver Machine Interface (ERTMS, 
2014 c). These constraints are costly and increase the technical and operational complex-
ity for train operators. 
 
ERTMS enables easier cross-border traffic movements across the EU, since coordina-
tion of domestic and international train services can be better performed. Moreover, the 
capacity on railway networks can increase significantly, as more trains can run on the 
same track. In the best-case scenario, the capacity can increase up to 40% more. That is 
one of the reasons why countries all over the world are using ERTMS, with nearly 50% 
of the total ERTMS sales made outside Europe (ERTMS, 2014 d).   
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 Figure 16: ERTMS trackside contracts – In percentage, by region (ERTMS, 2014 j) 
 
From the economic point of view, it entails a reduction of costs for freight operators, 
since they will only need ERTMS as the onboard system and staff’s training will be easier, 
as drivers will not need to know every signaling system (ERTMS, 2014 e).  Furthermore, 
the increased capacity will benefit customers, consumers and the economy.  
 
It is also a step forward for train operators. ERTMS monitors all operational modes 
(full supervising, shunting…). Hence, enriched data will be available for both drivers and 
control centers, which are continuously in contact by text messages (operation infor-
mation) or voice communication calls (ERTMS, 2014 h). The system will also become 
more redundant since the emergency brakes are automatically applied if a driver misin-
terprets a signal (ERTMS, 2014 f), reducing this way the risk for human errors. Besides, 
it is possible to know the track condition everywhere, and drivers have more time to ob-
serve the track ahead (ERTMS, 2014 h). 
 
In Europe 22,000 Km of route have already been contracted to work with ERTMS, 
developing 6 freight corridors along Europe (Rotterdam-Genoa; Stockholm-Napoli; Ant-
werp-Basel; Budapest-Valencia; Dresden-Constanta; Aachen-Terespol) (ERTMS, 2014 
g). Those corridors will be operable in short and medium term, and the equipment of 
ERTMS will be mandatory through them (ERTMS, 2014 e). In order to develop this pro-
ject efficiently, it is essential that the countries involved in the same Corridor work in a 
coordinated way and with a similar timeframe (ERTMS, 2014 g). Furthermore, some 
countries have gone beyond these obligations, as in the case of Denmark. 
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Figure 17: Global ERTMS contracted tracks (Km) in Europe (ERTMS, 2014 j) 
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Figure 18: Maintenance Services.  (Banedanmark c) 
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E SETTLEMENT OF FREIGHT TRAFFIC 
Settlement of freight traffic 27 May 2015.  Provided by J.J. Hansen, Banedanmark. (Han-
sen, 2015) 
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F INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
The questions were slightly adapted to match with the interviewee (if Banedanmark or DB 
Schenker) and further questions were improvised during the interview. 
 
Company Employee Position during the disruption 
Banedanmark 
Martin O. Jensen Deputy Director of Traffic Opera-tions 
Jens J. Hensen Traffic Manager 
DB Schenker  
Rail Scandinavia A/S Henrik M. Larsen Head of Operations 
 
 
Concerning general preparedness planning for unintended, sudden and major disruptions of 
rail tracks or train services: 
 
• Do you have plans for the unexpected? 
o If so, which are the key points in your preparedness or contingency plans for 
such events in regard to informing and coordinating with your clients and 
customers? 
• Judging from your experience of past events, which are the most difficult (complex) 
issues to handle during such disruptions? 
 
Concerning the incident on 29.11.2012 between Farris and Sommersted: 
 
• To which extent were you able to apply a preparedness or contingency plan for this 
event to inform and coordinate with your clients and customers (passenger and 
cargo)? 
• Was communication and coordination with clients and customers (cargo operators) 
satisfactory from your point of view? 
• Can you give us a brief sketch of how the interruption was handled in terms of re-
routing and re-loading during the repair period? 
• What were the main problems you faced during the disruption? 
• How were the additional costs distributed by you and clients? 
• What were the main lessons you learned from the incident? 
• Is it your impression that your customers/operators were satisfied with the way in 
which the disruption was handled (here we do not mean the repair of tracks, but the 
coordination with clients and the handling of rerouting/reloading etc.) 
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A) Interview to Martin O. Jensen, Previous Deputy Director of Traffic 
Operations. 21st of May 2015, Copenhagen, Denmark. 
 
Communication: Can be divided in two parts: 
• Communication that happens operationally underground: usually happens after the 
incident. It is carried out efficiently between the Infrastructure Management Operator 
of Banedanmark and the train operator company. It is conducted very smoothly and 
there is 24-7 coverage. There is a extend knowledge of which is the correct person to 
inform when an incident occurs. 
• Strategic communication: Covers the preparedness and planning, as well as strategic 
and tactical response when a disruption cannot be solved in a short period of time. It 
can become a political issue depending on the scope of the disruption. After the inci-
dent, Banedanmark has strengthened the ability to communicate between depart-
ments. However, communication with authorities can be difficult, because consider-
ing that the incident was in a Critical Infrastructure, not only Denmark was affected. 
Hence, Banedanmark had to deal with German railway authorities. There was the 
need of moving extra German staff to the north of Germany to open some stations to 
reallocate trains. 
 
Dealing with uncertainty:  One of the key points for dealing with the customers is to be 
honest about the forecasts. Banedanmark is usually conservative giving the estimation of 
what they think that a problem can last, but it is not positive to do it always because then they 
can lose credibility. 
There is the need to be precise in short and medium term forecasts, because the way of 
acting of the customers can change drastically depending on the estimations. On long term 
disruptions there is no need of being so accurate, because the planning probably will be the 
same. 
 
Planning: Have improved a lot doing plans for interruptions, but there is still the need of 
more improvement, especially for medium and long term interruptions. Taking into account 
that Denmark has not a meshed rail network, and that there are few main lines, alternatives 
to re-routing trains can be a difficult task. Therefore, more specific plans should be developed 
in order to be able to act immediately in case of disruption in an important line. 
On the other hand, in relation to short interruptions Banedanmark has a lot of experience 
in handling them. There is a lot of preparedness in this field since it is common in Denmark 
to have snowfalls that can interrupt the circulation of trains during short periods of time. 
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Response: Very good response in terms of planning the alternative routes, but difficulty 
implementing the plans (less than 12 hours). It is difficult to move traffic from the east coast 
of Denmark to the west coast because of different regulations and limitations, e.g.:  what kind 
of trains can go through a track, which weight, length, etc. One of the reasons it is because 
authorities have to check the plans and in some cases move extra staff to key points. 
 
Difference between freight – passengers: It is easier to reallocate passengers than freight 
since passengers can be shifted easily into buses. On the cargo side, there is a lot of freight 
traffic coming from Sweden to Germany through Denmark that is heavy and big. There were 
basically 3 alternatives for the freight: ferries, tracks and the west route of Denmark.  None-
theless, the western line of Denmark could only carry around the 50% of the capacity of the 
eastern one, being that there were a number of restrictions of weight, and the lowest number 
of rail tracks. The cargo companies are the responsible of choosing which the best option is. 
 
Other Difficulties: It can exist lack of motivation to move extra German staff due to the 
different priorities. Compare to Germany, Denmark is very small. Therefore, a problem in 
Denmark for them is minor.   
 
How it is possible to gain reliability: In the railway system always can happen accidents. 
Therefore, the only way to gain reliability is to do a high maintenance of the tracks and get 
quality certificates.  
 
B) Interview to Jens Jørgen Hansen, Traffic Manager in Banedan-
mark.  28th of May 2015, Copenhagen, Denmark. 
 
Key points when a disruption occurs: They have Contingency plans (CP) in all tracks 
where there is more than one operator running the tracks. These are prepared in cooperation 
with the operators. Those plans detail exactly what to do depending on the traffic information, 
and the personnel is instructed and trained to carry out the CP. If a disruption occurs, 
Banedanmark is who inform the passengers. 
For Unforeseen events, they use the principles of the established CP and try to adapt them 
to the situation. 
 
Most complex issues to handle? Sometimes operators and resources are not in the correct 
place when a CP must be carry out. Therefore there is a limitation of resources. 
 
Weakness 
Training and educating people from the Operational level in this center and in the Signal 
boxes. Before, personnel would gather for two days and run through some scenarios.  Due to 
the lack of resources in the last years now they gather one day and have an instructor teach 
the personnel.   
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In the new center they will have computer driven simulations of possible scenarios. 
Use more the Operations Room.  There is a lack of communication. People tend to make 
their plans and do not share them to the signal boxes or other operators. Leadership must 
push them to improve communication.  It is a cultural problem. 
Training and educating is the solution to make them understand the importance of sharing 
information. 
Communication with Germany. Communication is very good with Sweden but worse with 
Germany.  Germany gives less importance to Denmark as it is a small country.  Currently, 
there is much more communication but in a leadership level.  There are problems with lan-
guage and terminology too. More communication with Germany is needed in order to opti-
mize the traffic to Germany.  In Padborg they have much more communications daily as it is 
in the border. 
Intra-communication. Planners are not in touch enough with the operations team.  There 
should be more communication and involvement of the Operations Center. Implementation 
of plans is not always easy, therefore the planning sector should be more involved. 
 
Farris-Sommersted:  Plans used in the incident:  Normal unplanned plans.  They do not 
have a plan where it is a closure of the lines during three weeks involving 50% of the capac-
ity.  If the disruption had lasted only 6 hrs they could have waited.   
Once they had enough data, they offered a path with the weight, speed and length of the 
trains to the freight companies. 
For the long term disturbances the workers in the Control room are not working because 
there’s nothing to do, as the lines are closed. If there is a big incident they do 8 hours shifts 
because it requires a lot of concentration (in a normal situation they do 12 hours shifts). 
Communication with Germany was smooth but they had some problems at the beginning. 
Now they have learnt who to call and what to ask for, e.g. if freight trains are involved who 
and where to call. Now they have a list with contacts in every level, functions, and offices in 
Germany. 
Communication with Sweden is very good. Every two months one goes or comes to Den-
mark for a meeting. 
On the other hand, they have meetings with Germany every one or two years. Before the 
Farris incident they never talked with Germany. 
 
Planning.  Operations room.  Banedanmark and DSB are in the Operations room when a 
disruption occurs. DB Schenker and freight operators attend via phone or Skype. 
Updated CPs are found in their intranet and every department has its own area in the man-
agement system.  The personnel must follow the procedure as there are many instructions. 
The plans are segmented by the route the train follows and the track where the disruption 
has occurred.  The limit is of ten minutes of duration. 
Banedanmark evaluates the plan after using it and then they correct it. Try and error prac-
tice. 
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Plans include how to use it, what to do with the different trains, traffic information, and 
what to cancel or not cancel (number of the passenger trains). Depending of the time of the 
day the number of trains cancelled will change. 
If there is an incident causing a disruption in more than one track the plan would be com-
bined manually. Try to adapt both plans but there is no current plan saying how to combine 
it. But it is a rare situation (it would be totally new and would have to do it from scratch). 
This is an example of the Storm plan which was written after the two consecutive storms 
in 2013.  During the 1st storm they did not have a contingency plan.  However, they applied 
the lessons learnt in the storm that happened 2 weeks later.  With the lessons learnt they wrote 
a Storm contingency plan in 1 year. 
• What to do: 
o 36hrs before - Warning via telephone call to the personnel. Sms is sent. Con-
tact freight operators and make everybody aware. 
o 24hrs-meeting and plan how to scale down the capacity in that area.  Also 
consider the people and machine that are going to clean up, so that they have 
access to the area. 
o 20hrs- Same as 24 hrs. They have a 4 hrs margin. If it´s level 3, where there 
is a complete closure, the boss is involved. 
o 4hrs- make into effect the plan 
• Plans divided according to the wind speed. Green, yellow and red. 
• The plan includes Prioritized Tracks in order to clean up those tracks before the rest. 
• For every geographical area there are different plans. 
• Bridges have different rules. 
• Planners are in charge of planning after the first 48hrs. 
 
Traffic of goods:  They dialog with the operators and study the cases train by train.  How-
ever, they do not involve cargo operators in the decision making, they just inform them. 
Freight trains have to be parked in advised stations.   
CP for ordinary disturbances.  If a train that has to pass through Denmark is delayed they 
make a new timetable for every train that is 30 mins delayed from Germany (⅓ of the total 
trains (200 trains per week)) and freight trains get a new timetable through the company. In 
Sweden the margin is of 60 minutes, due to the system they use. It takes 30 mins to create a 
new plan. They need a better warning to warn them more time in advance. Warnings are not 
always accurate and the new timetables are not used and they need new timetables. 
The limitation of Sweden involves the use of Danish resources to stop the trains when 
going through Denmark in order to avoid a collapse in the Swedish border. 
Hansen would like to reschedule the timetable with a delay of 5 mins. 
They have big problem with trains that are not coming on time. Aproximately 40% of the 
trains coming from Germany are delayed because Germany does not give importance to Den-
mark.  
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C) Interview to Henrik Møller Larsen, Head of Operations at DB Schen-
ker Rail Scandinavia.  22nd May 2015, Høje Taastrup, Denmark. 
 
SMS - Safety Management System:  SMS segments three codes for importance of a 
situation based on the probability of the event and its severity.  Green, yellow and red are 
used to visualise if the event is acceptable, tolerable/Undesirable, and unacceptable respec-
tively. 
-Green: Good functioning of lines 
-Yellow: Planned interruption. E.g. Maintenance of the tracks and complete closedown of 
tracks. Margin of 4 hours of closure of the lines. 
-Very dark yellow. E.g. Strike in Germany 
-Red: Complete closure of the line. 
Red code is usually activated by the following causes, both including the complete closing 
of lines: 
·         Unplanned and unexpected incident.  Operations have to start right when the 
incident has occurred, e.g. Derailment of a train such as in the Farris-Sommersted 
incident. 
·         Foreseen incident: Plans can be held in advance and be ready for the incident. E.g. 
A weather hazard such as a strong storm where Banedanmark alerts that there will be 
a complete closure of the lines at 6.00pm. 
The Head of Operations activates the Contingency management plan.  All the parties in the 
management level are informed and aware that the system has entered a Red Code and they 
know exactly how to proceed by following already planned instructions: 
·         Safety manager: 
·         Public Affairs communication: Statement in regards of what is happening 
·         Sales department: Informs the customers. 
·         Operations center: Do a priority plan in order to adjust to the allowed capacity and 
avoid congestions in Germany and Sweden. 
·         Head of Operations: Schedule meetings to plan what is going to be done.  With the 
management department. 
 
Prioritization:  Capacity allocation on the rails is affected depending on the code.  DB 
Schenker has to prioritize which cargo is going to be allocated and when.  There are two 
criteria of prioritization: 
• Importance of the Customer: Volvo in Sweden puts a lot of pressure. 
• Total network impact: If the system is not working correctly it can congest network 
and impact other trains.   
 
Level 1. This level continues operation 
Level 2. Red mode.  Trains are cancelled 
Level 3. When the strike has arrived 
Level 4. Previous to the strike 
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Planning. Easy to act because the plans are exactly defined. 
• Short:  Weekly plans. 
• Long: After one week Operation Center manage the disruption. In the Sommer-
sted case planners tried to merge Danish plans with Germany and Sweden.  It 
was a very rare case. 
• Annual: Plans are updated every year. 
• Strategic: High level planning. 
 
They have they plans and once Banedanmark tells them the capacity they have, they shrink 
the plan to that capacity.  Improvise within the plans. 
Trafic in the main line involved in the accident: 
• DSB 2times / hour – 336 trains/week. 
• DB Schenker 200 freight trains per week. 
 
On Monday from 9.00 to 21.00 there was the complete closure of tracks due to construc-
tion of the double track line started after the accident.  Tinglev-Padborg remains single track 
and still offers less capacity, and it is more vulnerable and in bad state part of the track. 
 
Bottleneck /Difficulties: 
There were 12-14 freight trains/day planned during the Farris incident and DB Schenker 
was only able to materialize 50%. 
It takes 3-4 days to settle the system and match what you have planned after the disruption. 
Channels - Get permission to drive via other tracks. 
Sommersted incident: Banedanmark provided the alternative solution of running via Ton-
der but there was still the need of getting channels in the German side.  Banedanmark was 
very fast in giving channels in Denmark, but Germany DB Netz, much slower due to rigidity. 
Real line is run by a locomotive that can run in the three countries.  When the track was 
switched, its Diesel locos permitted to run the tracks in Denmark, but they were more than 
40 years old.  The train had to be switched in Tonder and it is almost impossible. You need 
to have the German loco and the Diesel Danish one and they have to change wagons and go 
back the other way. 
Limitations were severe in the new route: 
• Farris route: trains of 835m to Fredericia and of 700m to Sweden. 2500 tons of 
weight capacity. 
• New route: Northbound: 490m and South bound: 400m. Less capacity because 
it is single track but also less capacity on the trains.  Weight limitations due to 
two bridges in Germany in the West coast. In one, where the most traffic goes 
you can only have 800 tons and on the other one with limited amount of traffic 
(but a high amount of passenger traffic) you have 1600 tons.  It could be okay 
as the length is also reduced but there can be heavy cargo such as steel that may 
weigh 800 tons in 200m, what is very expensive. 
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Changing trains in Tonder was the main problem. However, they have learned from the 
incident and now they change locomotives in Eisbjerg, which have more capacity for chang-
ing trains. 
Collective agreement for safety. Denmark was more flexible but very rigid in Germany. 
 
 
Training 
Loco drivers. They know perfectectly the line they are driving, as they have to drive out and 
drive back with an instructor and an advisor. One day in DK and two days in Germany held 
to Regulation. Therefore, Operators learn by doing. 
 
Alternative routes 
First, they max out the capacity via ferries in Trelleborg- Rostock. It is a challenge because 
you buy capacity and the ferry has 600m maximum to take in but not in all the ferries because 
they have trucks and cars. 
Banedanmark provides high level plans with weight and length and then DB Schenker adapts 
their production system to these capacity limitations. 
Second, Intermodal terminal in Taulov and Padborg. 
DB Schenker provides the allocation available for each customer. If the cargo cannot be 
shipped it’s the customer who has to find alternative routes. 
 
Lessons learnt since the Farris incident. 
• There are other opportunities that they can run but with limited capacity. 
Last summer there was a planned closure of the tracks for three weeks and they planned 
with a German locomotive running up to Esbjerg.  They come from Fredericia with a Danish 
loco and change there. There is more space and it is better to change.  The German locomotive 
must be approved to run in the Danish rails by Ministry of Transport (10,000euros to check 
that the loco is in good state.) They are considering to have it every year. Also ask the Min-
istry of Transport how long it takes to have this certificate. One day would be good, one week 
is too much.   
• Now they have a permanent permission to drive so if anything happens, they have 
this alternative route.  They could triple the capacity of trains run compared to 
changing in Tonder.  If sometingh happens tomorrow and DB Schenker calls the 
German counterparts they would get the certificate very easily. 
• The more plans they have and the more time to plan, the more capacity they can use. 
• What you plan to what you materialise is very difficult to match. 
• Now they have more experience and they can run more capacity. 
• Improvisation is not a good idea. Planning is what will make the system work better. 
• If you have a timetable planned but you change locomotives, you have to reorder to 
use that track. Safety rules.   
All the costs were absorbed by DB Schenker. 
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Communication 
With customers: Try to be honest and transmit the answer from Banedanmark.   
Banedanmark is very conservative to do calculations and clients are not happy with that be-
cause it is important to know precisely: 5 days they can wait but maybe they cannot wait 7 
days.  If they find another way of transport they have to check the extra costs.  Companies 
using rail know that the infrastructure company is in charge to fix it. 
Now, planners know what they should ask for but the communication during the incident was 
very smooth. 
 
Capacity allocation after a disruption 
They do not have a problem in getting the capacity they like.  More trains during the night 
(less passengers) and less during the day (more passengers).   
The percentage during a disruption is the same as in a normal situation. During 6-9a.m and 
15-18p.m. no freight trains. Hectorrail canceled all the trains 
 
Loss of customers 
They find a different mode of transport and then they stick with that.  If a customer has a 
certain mode they will stick.  If you force them into change them you also force them to stick 
with that.  Always provide capacity so that they do not switch completely.  If they have 
suppliers they also have to adapt to the new methodology so it is not so easy. Some customers 
never come back, others will come back gradually and other will come back just after the 
incident. 
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